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THE LIGHT OF NATURE: JOHN LOCKE, 
NATURAL RIGHTS, AND THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
STEVEN J. HEYMAN* 
This Article explores John Locke’s theory of religious liberty, which deeply 
influenced the adoption of the First Amendment and the first state bills of rights.  
Locke sharply criticized the religious and political order of Restoration 
England—a regime in which the king claimed to hold absolute power by divine 
right and in which individuals were required by law to conform to the 
established church. 
In opposition to this regime, Locke developed a powerful theory of human 
beings as rational creatures who were entitled to think for themselves, to direct 
their own actions, and to pursue their own happiness within the bounds of the 
law of nature.  He then used this view to give a new account of political and 
religious life.  To promote their happiness in this world, rational individuals 
would agree to give up some of their natural freedom and to enter into a civil 
society for the protection of their natural rights or “civil interests” of life, 
liberty, and property.  By contrast, Locke argued that, when they made the 
social contract, rational individuals would not surrender any of their religious 
freedom, for they could reasonably hope to attain eternal happiness or 
salvation only if they used their minds to seek the truth about God and the path 
he desired them to follow.  For Locke, the most basic precepts of religion could 
be known by the light of nature and reason, while others were matters of faith.   
Locke’s conception of human beings as rational creatures provided the 
basis not only for individual rights but also for duties toward others.  Reason 
required one to recognize that other individuals were entitled to the same rights 
one claimed for oneself.  It followed that all members of society were obligated 
                                                        
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Tech. A.B. 1979, J.D. 1984, Harvard.  For 
thoughts on this Article, I am grateful to Kate Baldwin, Mark Rosen, Christopher Schmidt, Steven D. 
Smith, and participants in a Chicago-Kent Early Stage Workshop and a panel at the annual meeting of 
the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities that was held at Georgetown 
University Law Center in March 2018.  I also wish to thank Stephanie Flowers and Katlyn DeBoer for 
their valuable research assistance. 
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to respect both the religious freedom and the civil rights of those who differed 
with them in matters of religion. 
In addition to defending religious freedom, Locke advocated a strict 
separation of church and state.  Because liberty of conscience was an 
inalienable right, individuals would not grant the state any authority over 
spiritual matters.  Instead, those matters were reserved for the individuals 
themselves as well as for the religious societies or churches that they 
voluntarily formed to promote their salvation.   
In these ways, Locke sought not only to protect the inherent rights of 
individuals but also to dissolve the dangerous unity between church and state 
that characterized the Restoration.  At the same time, he sought to transform 
the nature of those institutions in a profound way: instead of being rooted in 
any notion of a hierarchy ordained by God or nature, both church and state 
should be founded on the consent of free and equal individuals and should 
respect their nature as rational beings.  Understood in this way, religion would 
be an ally rather than a threat to human liberty.  After exploring Locke’s theory, 
this Article sketches some of the ways that it contributed to the eighteenth-
century American view of religious liberty that was embodied in the First 
Amendment.   
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[No power to compel Religion can] be vested in the Magistrate by 
the Consent of the People; because no man can so far abandon the care of his 
own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether Prince 
or Subject, to prescribe to him what Faith or Worship he shall embrace.  For 
no Man can, if he would, conform his Faith to the Dictates, of another.  All the 
Life and Power of true Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of 
the mind: And Faith is not Faith without believing. 
— John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the American Revolution, the representatives of the people 
of Virginia issued a Declaration of Rights.2  The document began by 
                                                        
1. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 2d ed. 1690), in 
JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 13 (Mark Goldie ed., 
Liberty Fund 2010) [hereinafter LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION], 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-a-letter-concerning-toleration-and-other-writings 
[https://perma.cc/7PUV-UDJ9]. 
2. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Bill 
of Rights, doc. 2, at 3 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter VA. DECLARATION 
OF RIGHTS], http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss2.html 
[https://perma.cc/44P8-J77U]. 
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proclaiming “[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights” that they do not give up when they enter society, 
including life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of “happiness and safety.”3  
After setting forth a number of other rights, the Declaration culminated with the 
assertion 
[t]hat Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and 
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason 
and conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men 
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according 
to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of 
all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards 
each other.4 
Other state bills of rights also treated the free exercise of religion as a natural 
and inalienable right.5  The same view animated the efforts of Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison to defend religious liberty in Virginia during the decade 
following Independence, as well as the movement to protect that freedom in the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.6   
The American conception of religious liberty had important roots in the 
thought of the seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke.7  In A 
Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke mounted a powerful case for the liberty 
of conscience and the separation of church and state.8  The views that he 
                                                        
3. Id. art. 1, at 3. 
4. Id. art. 16, at 3–4.  As originally drafted by George Mason, this article provided “that all men 
should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion.”  LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE 
OF LIBERTY:  JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 85 (1995) (quoting 
Mason’s draft) (emphasis added).  The stronger language¾that “[a]ll men are equally entitled to enjoy 
the free exercise of religion”¾was formulated by James Madison.  Id. at 85, 86 (quoting Madison’s 
amendment) (emphasis added). 
5. See, e.g., PA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. II, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, Bill of Rights, doc. 5, at 6, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss5.html [https://perma.cc/C8U6-YLP3]; MASS. 
CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. II, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, Bill of Rights, doc. 
6, at 7, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss6.html 
[https://perma.cc/MH7W-95S4].  
6. See infra Part VII. 
7. See NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 63–90 (2012); 
JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 
29−33, 52−53 (3d ed. 2011); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC 20 (1994) 
[hereinafter ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC]. 
8. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1.  For some valuable works that 
explore Locke’s views on religion and religious liberty, see RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY 
POLITICS & LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1986); JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE, 
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expressed deeply influenced the American approach to religious freedom, just 
as his account of natural rights and the social contract in the Two Treatises of 
Government9 played a key role in justifying the American Revolution and 
laying the foundations for the new state and federal constitutions.10  Thus, an 
exploration of Locke’s views on religious liberty will shed great light on the 
way that Americans conceived of that freedom during the revolutionary and 
founding periods.   
As I shall show in this Article, Locke’s views on religious toleration are 
best seen in the context of his broader theory of human freedom.  To understand 
that theory, it is helpful to begin with the historical context in which he wrote.  
The restoration of the English monarchy in 1660 was soon followed by laws 
that reestablished the Church of England and imposed severe penalties and 
disabilities on Catholics and dissenting Protestants.  In addition to defending 
this regime of religious conformity and persecution, the Anglican clergy 
increasingly advocated an absolutist view of royal power by preaching that the 
king ruled by divine right.  From Locke’s perspective, these developments in 
church and state posed a stark danger of spiritual and political tyranny. 
It was in response to this threat that Locke developed his theory of religious 
and civil liberty.  At the core of that theory was the idea that human beings were 
rational creatures who had the capacity to think for themselves, to direct their 
own actions, and to pursue their own happiness.  As such, human beings were 
inherently free and equal.  To promote their well-being in this world, rational 
individuals would agree to form a civil society and establish a government that 
                                                        
TOLERATION AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE (2006) [hereinafter MARSHALL, EARLY 
ENLIGHTENMENT]; JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE: RESISTANCE, RELIGION, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
(1994) [hereinafter MARSHALL, RESISTANCE]; VICTOR NUOVO, CHRISTIANITY, ANTIQUITY, AND 
ENLIGHTENMENT: INTERPRETATIONS OF LOCKE (2011); ALAN P.F. SELL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DIVINES (1997); RICHARD VERNON, THE CAREER OF TOLERATION:  JOHN 
LOCKE, JONAS PROAST, AND AFTER (1997); JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY:  
CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002); JEREMY WALDRON, 
Locke, Toleration, and the Rationality of Persecution, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 88 (1993); MICHAEL P. 
ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2002); Mark Goldie, 
John Locke, Jonas Proast, and Religious Toleration 1688–1692, in THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 
C.1689–C.1833, at 143 (John Walsh et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Goldie, Religious Toleration]; Ian 
Harris, John Locke and Natural Law: Free Worship and Toleration, in NATURAL LAW AND 
TOLERATION IN THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT 59 (John Parkin & Timothy Stanton eds., 2013); 
Timothy Stanton, Natural Law, Nonconformity, and Toleration: Two Stages on Locke’s Way, in id. at 
35. 
9. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (student ed., 1988) (3d printing 1698) [hereinafter LOCKE, GOVERNMENT].   
10. See ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC, supra note 7, at 20. 
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was empowered to use force to protect their “Civil Interests” in life, liberty, and 
property.11  In addition to providing a justification for the state, reason imposed 
essential limits on government power. 
While civil society was concerned with the temporal good of human beings, 
religion was concerned with their eternal salvation and happiness in the world 
to come.  On Locke’s view, reason played a central role in this realm as well.  
The basic principles of religion could be found in what he called “Natural 
Religion,” that is, religion insofar as it was capable of being known by the “light 
of Reason” or “the light of Nature.”12  In An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke argued that individuals were capable of using reason to 
recognize that God existed and that they were dependent upon him.  If they 
hoped to attain salvation, they had to believe, worship, and act in ways that he 
found acceptable.  The actions that God required were contained in the law of 
nature and reason, which established the duties that individuals owed to him, to 
other people, and to themselves.  Living a good life in accord with those duties 
was the best worship of God.  There were limits to natural religion, for the 
particular forms of worship and belief that God desired could be ascertained 
only through divine revelation, which was a matter of faith.  However, while 
faith could teach things that were above reason, it could not teach anything that 
was contrary to reason, for that would conflict with the rational nature that God 
had bestowed on human beings.   
This view of the relationship between religion, faith, and reason provided 
the basis for Locke’s defense of religious freedom.  As rational creatures, 
individuals could hope to attain salvation only if they used their minds to seek 
the truth about God and his will.  Individuals could not be saved unless they 
actually held the beliefs they professed.  Thus, the freedom to form one’s own 
beliefs and to worship in accord with them was an inalienable right which 
rational individuals would not surrender when they entered civil society.  By 
the same token, reason dictated that one had a duty to recognize that other 
individuals were also rational creatures who were entitled to the same freedom 
                                                        
11. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 12. 
12. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 
490; id. bk. II, ch. XXVIII, § 8, at 352 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (4th ed. 1700) 
[hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING].  As Locke explains in an early work, “when we say 
that something is known by the light of nature, we would signify . . . the kind of truth whose knowledge 
man can, by the right use of those faculties with which he is provided by nature, attain by himself and 
without the help of another.”  JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE qu. II, 
fol. 23, at 119 (Robert Horwitz et al. eds. & trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990) [hereinafter LOCKE, LAW 
OF NATURE].  As the editors indicate, this work was composed in Latin “no later than 1664” and was 
first published, with an English translation, in 1954.  Id. at 29–30. 
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of worship and belief that one claimed for oneself.  Under the law of nature, all 
individuals were obligated to respect the religious liberty and the civil rights of 
those who differed with them in matters of religion, and indeed to treat them 
with charity and goodwill.  In addition, because Locke held that the law of 
nature had the same content as the moral law that was revealed by God in the 
Bible, this duty was also a precept of the Christian religion.   
In addition to endorsing religious liberty, Locke advocated a strict 
separation of church and state.  Because liberty of conscience was inalienable, 
individuals would not grant civil society any authority whatever over religious 
matters.  It followed that civil government should be devoted exclusively to 
civil interests, while spiritual matters were reserved for individuals themselves 
and for the religious societies or churches that they formed in their efforts to 
attain salvation. 
In these ways, Locke sought not only to protect the inherent rights of 
individuals but also to dissolve the dangerous unity between church and state 
that characterized the Restoration.  At the same time, he sought to transform the 
nature of those institutions in a profound way: instead of being rooted in any 
notion of a hierarchy ordained by God or nature, both church and the state 
should be based on the voluntary consent of free and equal individuals and 
should respect their nature as rational creatures.  Understood in this way, 
religion would be an ally rather than a threat to human liberty.   
In short, Locke invoked the idea that human beings were rational creatures 
to overturn the traditional conception of religion and politics.  Although it is 
well known that this idea was important for Locke, scholars have rarely 
undertaken to thoroughly explore the central role that it plays in his political 
and religious thought.  By focusing on the concept here, I hope to make a 
distinctive contribution to the literature on Locke as well as to develop a better 
understanding of the philosophical and theological origins of the American 
approach to religious liberty.   
This Article proceeds in six Parts.  Part II describes the Restoration 
religious and political order that is the background to Locke’s position.  I then 
turn to the theory of civil and religious freedom that he developed in opposition 
to this regime.  In Part III, I outline his conception of human beings as rational 
creatures who were capable of self-determination and show how it informed his 
account of their intellectual and practical activity.  I then explore the ways that 
Locke used this conception to develop a more libertarian theory of politics and 
religion.  Part IV considers his view of the political community as “a Society 
of Rational Creatures” who had united for the protection of their civil 
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interests,13 while Part V addresses his account of religious societies or churches 
as free and voluntary associations that individuals form to promote their 
salvation.  Part V also discusses his understanding of faith and reason as well 
as the crucial part that it played in his defense of religious freedom.  Part VI 
explains how Locke sought to reform the dominant religion of his time by 
placing reason at the center of Christian theology.  Part VII concludes with a 
brief discussion of Locke’s legacy for the American view of religious liberty 
during the revolutionary and founding eras. 
II. THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ORDER OF RESTORATION ENGLAND 
A. The Effort to Impose Religious Uniformity 
Locke was born in Somerset, England, in 1632.14  As he later observed, “I 
no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself in a storm.”15  In 
1642, the increasingly bitter conflict between King Charles I and his Parliament 
erupted into a Civil War.16  The struggle stemmed in part from the fear that 
Charles was seeking to become an absolute ruler.17  At the same time, the 
dispute was a religious one, pitting the king’s Anglican supporters against his 
Puritan opponents.18  The parliamentary forces prevailed.19  In 1649, Charles 
was tried, convicted, and executed as a tyrant and a traitor to the people of 
England, and the nation was declared to be a Commonwealth.20  In less than a 
decade, however, the new regime began to collapse, and in 1660 the late king’s 
son returned from exile to become King Charles II.21 
At first, it appeared that the restoration of the monarchy might bring a 
considerable measure of reconciliation between the opposing groups.  In 1660, 
Charles II issued The Declaration of Breda, which promised “a liberty to tender 
consciences.”22  But the new king’s Anglican supporters were in a less forgiving 
                                                        
13. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 163, at 376–77. 
14. See ROGER WOOLHOUSE, LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 1 (2007). 
15. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TRACTS ON GOVERNMENT tract I, at 119 (Philip Abrams ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967) [hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TRACTS] (originally drafted in 1660–62). 
16. WOOLHOUSE, supra note 14, at 8. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. at 8–9; JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND, 
1558–1689, at 135–43 (2000). 
19. See ROGER LOCKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN, 1471–1714, at 285–86 (1964). 
20. See id. at 292–93. 
21. See id. at 305–06. 
22. THE DECLARATION OF BREDA (1660), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF 
THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 466 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 1906).  
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mood.  With “bitter memories” of the persecution that they themselves had 
suffered under the Commonwealth, the Anglicans who dominated the new 
Parliament took a hardline position on religious matters.23  In 1662, they passed 
the Act of Uniformity, which reestablished the Church of England as the 
national church.24  Declaring that a lack of religious discipline had produced 
the “Factions and Schismes” that had led to the Civil War, Parliament moved 
to reimpose a uniform form of worship on the nation.25  All clergy members 
had to be ordained by Anglican bishops and had to affirm, and conduct services 
in accord with, the Book of Common Prayer.26  All preachers, lecturers, and 
college heads were required to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles of 
Religion, the Anglican statement of the faith that had been adopted a century 
earlier.27  This effort to compel Anglican conformity resulted in more than two 
thousand “Puritan clergy—including a third of the London ministers¾[being] 
forced out” of their positions, including “around 200 lecturers, college fellows, 
and schoolmasters.”28  Other Restoration-era legislation excluded religious 
dissenters from holding civil or military office;29 banned Quaker meetings and 
all other public services that did not use the Anglican liturgy;30 and imposed 
severe restrictions on dissenting clergy and preachers.31   
During the same year that it adopted the Act of Uniformity, Parliament also 
resolved to reinstate censorship of the press.  The new Licensing Act began by 
denouncing “the general licentiousnes” of the Commonwealth period, which 
had allowed “many evil disposed persons” to publish subversive works¾a 
practice that they continued to engage in “to the high dishonour of Almighty 
God[,] the endangering the peace of these Kingdomes[,] and raising a 
disaffection to His most Excellent Majesty and His Government.”32  To combat 
                                                        
23. COFFEY, supra note 18, at 167. 
24. Charles II, 1662: An Act for the Uniformity of Public Prayers, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 4 (1662) 
(Eng.), in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1628–80, at 364–70 (John Raithby ed., 1819), 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp364-370 [https://perma.cc/4AVU-ZL9Q]. 
25. Id. preamble. 
26. Id. §§ 1–5, 9. 
27. Id. §§ 13, 15; The Church of England, Articles of Religion (1562), in THE BOOK OF COMMON 
PRAYER (1662) [hereinafter THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES]. 
28. COFFEY, supra note 18, at 168 (citation omitted). 
29. Id. at 168, 172 (describing Corporation Act of 1661 and Test Acts of 1673 and 1678). 
30. Id. at 168–69 (recounting Quaker Act of 1662 and Conventicles Acts of 1664 and 1670). 
31. Id. (discussing Second Conventicles Act and Five Miles Act of 1665). 
32. An Act for Preventing the Frequent Abuses in Printing Seditious Treasonable and 
Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets and for Regulating Printing and Printing Presses, 14 Car. 2, c. 33 
(1662) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 1, at 112, 
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this evil, the Act banned the publication of all “heretical seditious schismatical 
or offensive Bookes or Pamphlets wherein any Doctrine or Opinion shall be 
asserted . . . which is contrary to Christian Faith or the Doctrine or Discipline 
of the Church of England,” or which leveled any scandalous attack against the 
church, the state, their leaders, or private persons.33  To effectuate this 
prohibition, the Act made it unlawful to print any book or pamphlet without 
first receiving a license from one of the censors to be appointed under the 
statute.34   
As the historian John Coffey has observed, the Restoration-era laws that 
attempted to suppress religious dissent¾laws that are collectively known as the 
Clarendon Code¾resulted in a persecution that was unparalleled in 
seventeenth-century Protestant Europe: “Dissenters were arrested, prosecuted 
and imprisoned in their thousands.  Hundreds of meetings were violently 
broken up, and Dissenters were harassed by organised gangs and angry 
mobs. . . .  Dissenters also had to pay fines which were heavy and sometimes 
crippling.”35  Hundreds of Quakers were banished or chose to emigrate to the 
American colonies.36  Although the laws that prescribed the death penalty for 
heresy and blasphemy largely fell into disuse, and were abolished by statute in 
1678, many dissenters died as a result of the harsh conditions they endured in 
prison.37   
In persecuting nonconformity, hardline Anglicans were motivated not only 
by a desire for revenge but also by a fear of how they themselves might be 
treated if the dissenters should return to power in the future.38  At the same time, 
the Anglican approach rested on political and theological beliefs that were 
widely accepted in post-Reformation Europe.39  These beliefs held that the 
people of a nation made up “a single Christian community.”40  Every member 
of the commonwealth belonged to the national church and vice versa.41  On this 
                                                        
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs1.html [https://perma.cc/3KHM-
TVZ9]. 
33. Id.  
34. Id. 
35. COFFEY, supra note 18, at 170.  
36. Id. at 177–78. 
37. See id. at 170, 173-76, 179. 
38. Id. at 167, 173, 180. 
39. See PETER MARSHALL, THE REFORMATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 132–34 (2009) 
[hereinafter MARSHALL, REFORMATION]. 
40. Id. at 113. 
41. For a classic articulation of this view, see RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF 
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY bk. VIII, ch. 1 (Arthur Stephen McGrade ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) 
(1648).  As one Anglican writer put it, ancient Christian doctrine dictated that “[t]here must be but one 
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view, church and state were simply two aspects of the same society, a society 
that had both spiritual and temporal concerns.42  With regard to spiritual 
matters, the church and the state were obligated to work together to promote 
true religion and the salvation of souls.43   
Within this broad view there could be different accounts of the relationship 
between church and state.  During the 1660s and early 1670s, many Anglicans 
articulated an Erastian position which emphasized the power of the civil ruler 
or “magistrate” to impose uniformity in external forms of worship in order to 
prevent religious dissension and maintain civil peace.44  As the Restoration 
wore on, however, many Anglicans moved toward an Augustinian or High 
Church position, which stressed the primacy of the established church in 
religious matters.45  On this view, the magistrate was bound to use his coercive 
power to uphold the teaching authority of the clergy and to punish individuals 
who refused to accept their views of Christian doctrine and worship.46  In its 
strongest form, this High Church position held that episcopacy, or the rule of 
bishops, was not simply one possible form of church government but instead 
was a matter of divine right (jure divino)—an institution that Christ himself 
established when he founded the church.47 
In either its Erastian or its High Church form, the Reformation view 
embraced several justifications for the use of state power to suppress religious 
nonconformity when it took the form of offenses such as heresy (maintaining 
beliefs contrary to Christian orthodoxy) or schism (causing a separation within 
the body of the church).48  First, by bringing dissenters to true religion and 
eternal salvation, the state coerced them for their own good.49  Second, heresy 
                                                        
Church, in one place.”  WILLIAM SHERLOCK, A RESOLUTION OF SOME CASES OF CONSCIENCE WHICH 
RESPECT CHURCH-COMMUNION 20 (London, Fincham Gardiner, 2d ed. 1683), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015063594355 [https://perma.cc/3AX6-RQBY]. 
42. See HOOKER, supra note 41, bk. VIII, ch. 1; MARSHALL, REFORMATION, supra note 39, at 
113.   
43. See Mark Goldie, The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England, in FROM 
PERSECUTION TO TOLERATION 331, 334 (Ole Peter Grell et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Goldie, 
Religious Intolerance]. 
44. See id. at 332–33.  Interestingly, Locke himself endorsed this position in the early 1660s, 
before he came to support religious toleration.  See LOCKE, TWO TRACTS, supra note 15, tract I, at 
120.   
45. Goldie, Religious Intolerance, supra note 43, at 332–37, 358, 365, 367–68. 
46. See id. at 332–37, 365, 367. 
47. See Mark Goldie, John Locke and Anglican Royalism, 31 POL. STUD. 61, 77–79 (1983) 
[hereinafter Goldie, Anglican Royalism].   
48. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 25, 28 (distinguishing between heresy and schism). 
49. See id. at 34–35. 
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and schism were grave sins which deserved to be punished.50  Third, heretics 
poisoned the minds of others and led them on a path to perdition, while schism 
injured the body of the church itself.51  Finally, because church and state were 
inseparably connected, an attack on the established religion also amounted to 
sedition or an attack on royal authority—an argument that had particularly 
strong resonance for Anglicans when they recalled the Puritan revolution 
against Charles I, and when they perceived renewed efforts to rebel against his 
son during the Restoration.52 
B. The Divine Rights of Kings 
For all these reasons, much of the Anglican clergy strongly supported the 
Clarendon Code’s effort to suppress religious dissent.53  At the same time, they 
also increasingly espoused the view that the monarch’s power, like that of the 
bishops, was jure divino.54  In that regard, they relied on works like Sir Robert 
Filmer’s Patriarcha, which was written to refute the idea that human beings 
were naturally free and equal and thus were “at liberty to choose what form of 
government [they] please.”55  Drawing on a highly contestable interpretation of 
the Old Testament as well as on an authoritarian conception of the law of nature, 
Filmer maintained that no one was naturally free, for all were born in 
“subjection to their parents.”56  When the first man, Adam, was created by God, 
he came to have “royal authority over [his] children” by a natural “right of 
fatherhood.”57  In this way he attained a “lordship . . . over the whole 
world, . . . [that] was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any 
monarch which hath been since the creation,” with the “power of life and death” 
over his offspring.58  Adam’s sovereignty was inherited by his descendants, 
including the biblical patriarchs.59  For Filmer, this “natural authority of a 
supreme father” was the foundation of the power of all rulers in the world.60  
                                                        
50. See MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, at 450-53.  
51. See id. at 450–53; COFFEY, supra note 38, at 36.  
52. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 38–41; MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, 
at 440–49.  
53. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 26–27; Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at 75–76, 
80.  
54. See Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at 64–71.  
55. ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA (1680), reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 
§ 1, at 2–3 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). 
56. Id. § 3, at 7. 
57. Id. § 3, at 6.  
58. Id. § 4, at 7.  
59. Id. § 3, at 6–7. 
60. Id. § 10, at 11.   
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Drawing on Filmer and other writers, the Anglican clergy contended that the 
king possessed unlimited power by divine right and that subjects were obliged 
to render him absolute obedience.61 
C. Locke’s Critique of the Restoration Regime 
In these ways, hardline Anglican religious and political leaders defended a 
regime in which conformity to the established church was mandated by law and 
the king claimed to rule by divine right.  Much of Locke’s life and work was 
devoted to attacking this conception of the social order.  In the First Treatise of 
Government, he demolished Filmer’s position that all political power was 
derived from the sovereignty of Adam.62  To begin with, Locke argued, Filmer 
had failed to demonstrate that either Scripture or the law of nature gave Adam 
absolute power over his children or “Dominion over the World.”63  Even if 
Adam had possessed such authority, it could not have descended to his heirs.64  
And in any event, since the knowledge of who those heirs were had been 
“utterly lost” long ago, there was absolutely no way to determine who was 
entitled to exercise such power now.65   
On these grounds, Locke concluded that the Anglican argument for 
absolutism was unfounded.  On the contrary, as he wrote in the Second Treatise, 
“Absolute Monarchy, which by some Men is counted the only Government in 
the World, . . . can be no Form of Civil Government at all,” for it is 
incompatible with the very purpose of civil society, which is to ensure that the 
rights of all individuals are protected under the law.66  However much 
protection those rights might find against other private individuals under an 
absolute monarchy, they would receive no protection against the monarch 
himself.67  Indeed, by exposing individuals to the unlimited power of the ruler, 
                                                        
61. See Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at 64–71.  As the University of Oxford 
expressed this doctrine in its condemnation of Whig political theory, individuals must “submit[] . . . , 
for the Lord’s sake, . . . to the king as supreme,” and “this submission and obedience is to be cleare, 
absolute, and without exception of any state or order of men[.]”  The Judgement and Decree of the 
University of Oxford, Passed in their Convocation Against Certain Pernicious Books and Damnable 
Doctrines, Destructive to [the] Sacred Persons of Princes, Their State and Government, and of All 
Human Society (1683), reprinted in 4 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF LORD KENYON 163, 165 (1894), 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/4140f842-73be-41c4-ba55-56c21d4401f2 
[https://perma.cc/9C3W-PZE4]. 
62. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. I.  
63. Id. bk. II, § 1, at 267 (summarizing argument of the First Treatise).   
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
66. See id. bk. II, § 90, at 326; id. bk. II, § 94, at 329. 
67. Id. bk. II, §§ 91–93, at 326–28. 
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an absolute monarchy would be even worse than a condition of anarchy in 
which everyone had to fend for himself.68   
Locke was equally unsparing in his criticism of the Restoration religious 
order.  In A Letter Concerning Toleration, he wrote that “all Ecclesiastical men, 
who boast themselves to be the Successors of the Apostles,” should follow the 
apostles’ example by using only spiritual means “to promote the Salvation of 
Souls.”69  When churchmen employ “the Sword, or other Instruments of Force,” 
to coerce individuals in matters of conscience, it is plain that they are motivated 
not by charity or goodwill but rather by an “insatiable desire of Dominion” over 
others.70  In Locke’s view, “the unhappy Agreement that we see between the 
Church and State” stemmed from a corrupt bargain or alliance between the two, 
in which each used the other to increase its own power at the expense of the 
people: the king used his coercive force to compel them to submit to the clergy’s 
authority, while in return the clergy declared that he ruled by divine right.71  
Under this arrangement, Locke asserted, the clergy became “more Ministers of 
the Government, than Ministers of the Gospel; and . . . they endeavour[ed] with 
all their might to promote that Tyranny in the Commonwealth, which otherwise 
they should not be able to establish in the Church[.]”72  
III. MAN AS A RATIONAL CREATURE 
The theory that Locke developed was intended to liberate individuals from 
these forms of domination.  At the core of that theory was the notion that human 
beings were rational creatures.  Of course, this idea did not originate with Locke 
but instead had a long history in Western thought.  Aristotle asserted that man 
was the only animal with speech or reason (logos) and that the good for human 
                                                        
68. See id. bk. II, § 91, at 326–27; id. bk. II, § 137, at 359–60. 
69. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 61–62; accord id. at 11, 18–
19.  The Letter was published in Latin in April 1689.  See Mark Goldie, Notes on the Texts of LOCKE, 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at xxix–xxx.  That fall saw the publication of an 
English translation by Locke’s friend William Popple, which was made with Locke’s knowledge but 
without his involvement.  See id. at xxix.  In this Article, I quote from the Popple translation, which is 
the one that has been used in the English-speaking world from Locke’s day to our own.  For a more 
recent and literal translation, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Michael 
Silverthorne trans. 2010) (1689), in LOCKE ON TOLERATION 3 (Richard Vernon ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2010). 
70. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 9–11, 60, 159–60. 
71. Id. at 60–61.  For an earlier statement of this point, see John Locke, Toleration A (c. 1675), 
in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS 230, 234 (Mark Goldie ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).  
72. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 61. 
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beings was “an activity of [the] soul in accord with reason.”73  The Scholastic 
tradition, which synthesized Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, 
characterized human beings not only as rational animals but also as “rational 
creature[s]” who were created by God, and who were capable of using their 
minds to discern the “natural law” which was an expression of the “Divine 
Reason” by which the universe was governed.74  In his writings on religion, 
politics, and other subjects, Locke drew on this traditional notion of a rational 
creature but used it in a distinctive way to conceive of human beings as free, 
equal, and independent individuals who had an inherent right to use their minds 
to direct their own lives and to establish civil and religious institutions that were 
based on consent.  In this way, he developed a view that was sharply opposed 
to the Restoration order and that provided key inspiration for the American 
conception of religious and political freedom.   
After exploring Locke’s basic concept of a rational creature, this Part shows 
how it underlies his account of our intellectual and practical activity.  The 
following Parts then explain how he used this concept to transform traditional 
conceptions of political and religious life.75   
A. The Concept of a Rational Creature 
Throughout his writings, Locke maintains that God has made man “a 
Rational Creature.”76  This is the source of “the dignity and excellency” of 
human nature.77  It is what allows free, self-determining individuals to pursue 
their own good, to live in a condition of peace and justice with others, and to 
seek a proper relationship with God.   
As Locke makes clear, however, the concept of a rational creature is not 
simply descriptive but also normative.  Nature gives individuals the potential 
                                                        
73. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 1, ch. 7, 1098a3-18, at 12–13 (Robert C. Bartlett & 
Susan D. Collins trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2011); see also ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. I, ch. 2, 
1253a8-9, at 37 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984).  
74. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I, Q. 76, art. 3; pt. I–II, Q. 91, art. 1–2; pt. 
I–II, Q. 94, art. 1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947), 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/ [https://perma.cc/872U-WD82]. 
75. See infra Parts IV–V.   
76. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AS DELIVERED IN THE 
SCRIPTURES ch. II, at 13 (John C. Higgins-Biddle ed., Clarendon Press 1999) (1695) [hereinafter 
LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY]. 
77. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION § 31 (1693), in SOME THOUGHTS 
CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING 25 (Ruth W. Grant & 
Nathan Tarcov eds., Hackett Publishing Co. 1996) [hereinafter LOCKE, EDUCATION].  
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to live in accord with reason, but realizing this potential requires diligence and 
effort.78   
As Locke explains in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, this effort 
begins with childrearing.79  Parents have an obligation to care for and educate 
their children.80  The goal of education is to form them into rational creatures.81  
Instead of imposing harsh discipline, parents should reason with their children 
from an early age, for they “love to be treated as rational creatures sooner than 
is imagined.”82  Education shapes the character of individuals by developing 
their disposition to submit their will to reason and to follow its dictates on what 
is best, even when those dictates run contrary to their own desires.83  The ability 
to do this is “the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth.”84   
From an intellectual standpoint, the goal of education is not to give the 
learner a perfect mastery of all (or indeed any) subjects but rather “to give his 
mind that freedom, that disposition, and those habits that may enable him to 
attain any part of knowledge he shall apply himself to, or stand in need of, in 
the future.”85  Education seeks to cultivate our mental faculties, for “the right 
improvement and exercise of our reason [is] the highest perfection that [we] 
can attain to in this life.”86  Although this process begins in childhood, it is 
something that should continue throughout our lives, as Locke stresses in one 
of his final works, Of the Conduct of the Understanding.87   
In the rest of this Part, I explore in greater depth what Locke means when 
he says that human beings are rational creatures.  I begin with the realm of 
intellectual activity or the search for truth and then turn to practical activity or 
the pursuit of happiness.   
                                                        
78. JOHN LOCKE, OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING §§ 1, 6 (1706), in SOME 
THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING 167, 178 
(Ruth W. Grant & Nathan Tarcov eds., Hackett Publishing Co. 1996) [hereinafter LOCKE, CONDUCT].  
79. See LOCKE, EDUCATION, supra note 77, § 1, at 10. 
80. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 58, at 306. 
81. See LOCKE, EDUCATION, supra note 77, § 36, at 27.  
82. Id. § 81, at 58. 
83. Id. § 33, at 25. 
84. Id. § 33, at 25; see also id. § 38, at 29; id § 45, at 32–33. 
85. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 12, at 187. 
86. LOCKE, EDUCATION, supra note 77, § 122, at 95. 
87. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 1, at 167.   
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B. Reason and the Search for Truth 
Locke holds that, in the intellectual realm, individuals should not 
unreflectively follow tradition, custom, or commonly held opinions.88  They 
must not place “blind[], . . . implicit faith” in the views of others, such as their 
“parents, neighbors, ministers,” “sect,” or “party.”89  Instead, as rational 
creatures, individuals must take the “trouble of thinking and examining for 
themselves.”90   
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke contends that when 
we strip away the authority of tradition and convention, we are able to discern 
the true sources of the knowledge that we have about ourselves and the world.91  
He identifies these sources as intuition, sensation, and reason.92   
It is through intuition that we have knowledge of our own existence.  
Echoing René Descartes, Locke explains that when “I think [or] reason” or 
when “I feel Pleasure and Pain,” I am necessarily aware that I exist.93  Indeed, 
even “[i]f I doubt of all other Things, that very doubt makes me perceive my 
own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that.”94  In this way, 
“Experience . . . convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own 
Existence, and an internal infallible Perception that we are.”95  
By contrast, the great majority of our beliefs are based on information that 
we gain through our senses.96  Although I can possess knowledge of the 
existence of some particular things, such as the paper I am writing on, most of 
the beliefs that derive from sensation are matters of probability and opinion 
rather than certainty and knowledge.97   
                                                        
88. See id. § 6, at 175. 
89. Id. § 3, at 169; id. § 6, at 175; LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 
IV, § 22, at 99. 
90. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 3, at 169. 
91. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. II, § 1, at 48. 
92. See id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 2, at 618. 
93. Id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618.  For a seminal discussion by Descartes, see RENÉ DESCARTES, 
THE MEDITATIONS CONCERNING FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641), in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND 
MEDITATIONS 59, 82 (Laurence J. LaFleur trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1960). 
94. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618.   
95. Id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618–19.   
96. See id. bk. IV, ch. XI, § 1, at 630. 
97. See id. bk. IV, ch. XI, §§ 2–3, 9, at 630–32, 635–36; id. bk. IV, chs. XV–XVI, at 654–68. 
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It follows that in many areas our knowledge is quite limited.98  It is a mark 
of wisdom not to insist on knowing things that we cannot know.99  That 
insistence begins in intellectual arrogance and may end in “perfect Scepticism,” 
when one comes to despair of the possibility of knowing anything at all.100  
Locke maintains, however, that as rational creatures we have a duty to sincerely 
“search after . . . [the] Truth” and the knowledge that we are capable of 
attaining.101  This is especially true with regard to those matters that are of the 
greatest concern to human beings.102   
The most important of these matters relates to the existence of God.  
According to Locke, we can have certain knowledge of God’s existence 
through the use of reason, understood here in the sense of rigorous logical 
demonstration.  Presenting a version of the traditional cosmological argument, 
Locke maintains that our existence ultimately can be traced to a first cause that 
exists from eternity and that is the source of all the power, perception, and 
knowledge that we find within ourselves as “knowing intelligent Being[s] [that 
exist] in the World.”103  In this way, “from the Consideration of our selves, and 
what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the 
Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That there is an eternal, most 
powerful, and most knowing Being,” which is what we call God.104  In other 
passages, Locke offers a version of the traditional argument from design and 
asserts that only an intelligent creator could have “produce[d] that order, 
harmony, and beauty which is to be found in Nature.”105  In short, “the visible 
marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power, appear so plainly in all the Works 
                                                        
98. See, e.g., id. bk. IV, ch. III, at 538–62; id. bk. IV, ch. XIV, § 2, at 652; id. bk. IV, ch. XVI, 
§ 4, at 660. 
99. See id. bk. I, ch. I, §§ 4–7, at 44–47; id. bk. IV, ch. XI, § 10, at 636; id. bk. IV, ch. XII, § 12, 
at 647. 
100. Id. bk. I, ch. I, §§ 5–7, at 45–47. 
101. Id. bk. III, ch. XI, § 3, at 509; accord id. bk. I, ch. I, § 6, at 46; id. bk. IV, ch. XII, § 11, at 
646; id. bk. IV ch. XVII, § 24, at 688. 
102. See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. 1, §§ 5–6, at 45–46; id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 1 at 619; id. bk. IV, ch. XI, 
§ 8, at 634; id. bk. IV, ch. XII, § 11, at 646; LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 8, at 182–83; id. § 23, 
at 195; JOHN LOCKE, The Preface: An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul’s Epistles, by Consulting 
St. Paul Himself, in 1 A PARAPHRASE AND NOTES ON THE EPISTLES OF ST PAUL TO THE GALATIANS, 
1 AND 2 CORINTHIANS, ROMANS, EPHESIANS 103, 115 (Arthur W. Wainwright ed., Clarendon Press 
1987) (1707) [hereinafter LOCKE, ST. PAUL].  
103. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. X, §§ 3–5, at 620. 
104. Id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 6, at 621. 
105. E.g., id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 10, at 624. 
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of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, 
cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.”106   
As we shall see, Locke’s conviction that human beings can know the 
existence of God through reason plays a central role in his views on morality 
and religion.107  Here, I wish to focus on the ethics of “the search of truth and 
knowledge.”108 
For Locke, this search should be characterized by intellectual freedom.  
Individuals who think for themselves have little desire to impose their views on 
others.109  As Locke puts it, “it is undoubtedly a wrong use of my understanding 
to make it the rule and measure of another man’s; a use which it is neither fit 
for nor capable of.”110  Locke therefore condemns those rulers, both civil and 
ecclesiastical, who seek to “enslave[]” their subjects “in that which should be 
the freest part of Man, their Understandings.”111  And by the same token, he 
criticizes those who “lazily enslav[e] their [own] Minds, to the Dictates and 
Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine; 
and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow.”112 
Instead, individuals have a duty to use their faculties to actively seek truth 
and knowledge.  In a powerful discussion that anticipates John Stuart Mill’s 
position in On Liberty,113 Locke emphasizes the ways in which one’s opinions 
are limited by one’s own perspective.  One must impartially examine one’s 
beliefs to ensure that they are not merely the product of tradition, custom, or 
convention, or distorted by self-interest or prejudice.114  It is only when we 
                                                        
106. Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 9, at 89.  For Locke, this argument is strongly associated with St. Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans, which asserts that God has made “his eternal power and Godhead” “clearly seen” 
“by the things that [he] made” in creation.  Romans 1:19-20 (King James).  In his paraphrase of this 
passage, Locke writes that “what is to be known of [God’s] invisible Being, [may] be clearly 
discovered and understood in the visible beauty, order, and operations observable in the constitution 
and parts of the universe by all those who would . . . apply their minds [in] that way.”  LOCKE, ST. 
PAUL, supra note 102, at 494 (footnote omitted); see also LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra 
note 12, bk. IV, ch. X, § 7, at 622 (relying on the same passage in Romans).  In the Essay, Locke also 
mentions the traditional ontological argument¾which seeks to prove God’s existence from the idea 
that human beings have of God as a most perfect being¾but treats it as less conclusive than the 
cosmological argument.  See id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 7, at 621–22. 
107. See infra text accompanying notes 221–33. 
108. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 10, at 184. 
109. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 4, at 661. 
110. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 23, at 196. 
111. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XX, § 4, at 708; accord id. 
bk. I, ch. IV, § 22, at 99. 
112. Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 22, at 99. 
113. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. II (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859).   
114. See LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 10, at 184; id. § 12, at 185. 
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liberate ourselves from these constraints and seek the truth for its own sake that 
we can attain “that freedom of the understanding which is necessary to a 
rational creature, and without which it is not truly an understanding.”115   
Like Mill, Locke also stresses the value of intellectual diversity.  Even those 
who make an effort to follow reason often go wrong because they are confined 
within their own narrow intellectual worlds.116  To overcome this one-sidedness 
and achieve a more comprehensive view, individuals should engage with other 
fields of knowledge and with different sorts of people.117  They should entertain 
objections to their own beliefs, participate in reasoned discussion, and engage 
in “a free consideration of the several views and sentiments of thinking men of 
all sides.”118  Above all, they should not mistreat those who disagree with them, 
but instead strive “to maintain Peace, and the common Offices of Humanity, 
and Friendship, in the diversity of Opinions.”119 
C. Reason and the Pursuit of Happiness 
Reason is also central to Locke’s account of practical activity.  In contrast 
to inanimate objects, humans are intelligent beings who have the power to use 
their minds to direct their own actions.120  This power, which Locke calls the 
will, is what makes them free agents.121 
In an important chapter of the Essay, Locke explores the complex 
relationship between freedom and the will.  He argues that the will is 
determined by desire¾specifically, by one’s desire for happiness.122  Locke 
understands happiness in terms of pleasure and the absence of pain.123  He 
makes clear, however, that there can be “pleasure and pain of the Mind, as well 
as the Body.”124  Things are called “Good” insofar as they are apt to produce 
pleasure in us and “Evil” insofar as they are apt to cause pain.125   
In most cases, a person is not free to will or not to will; the will is ordinarily 
determined by the most pressing desire.  Yet this is liberty only in an equivocal 
                                                        
115. Id. § 12, at 186. 
116. See id. § 3, at 169. 
117. See, e.g., id. § 22, at 195. 
118. Id. § 3, at 171. 
119. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 4, at 659. 
120. See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 7–9, at 237–38. 
121. See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 8–9, at 237–38. 
122. See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 41, at 258.  
123. See id.   
124. Id. 
125. Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 42, at 259. 
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sense, in which one is buffeted by “blind impulse[s]” like “a bubble by the force 
of the wind.”126 
Locke contends, however, that in many cases one has the power to suspend 
the execution of one’s desires, to free oneself “from any necessary 
determination of [one’s] will to any particular action,” until reason has an 
opportunity to consider what course of action will promote one’s “real 
happiness.”127  This is the foundation of human freedom, “the hinge on which 
turns the liberty of intellectual Beings in their constant endeavours after . . . true 
felicity.”128 
At the same time, Locke points out that the determination of the will by 
reason, and of reason by the good, involves not only freedom but also necessity 
and obligation.  Everyone, he says, “is put under a necessity by his constitution, 
as an intelligent Being, to be determined in willing by his own Thought and 
Judgment, what is best for him to do.”129  Yet Locke denies that this should be 
viewed as an abridgment or restraint of liberty.  Freedom involves self-
determination; if the will were to be determined by anything other than an 
individual’s own judgment, then “he would be under the determination of some 
other than himself, which is want of Liberty.”130  Moreover, “the very end of 
our Freedom” is to enable us to “attain the good that we chuse.”131 
D. Reason and Natural Law 
According to Locke, reason is not only capable of guiding individuals 
toward their true happiness; it is also capable of deducing the principles of 
morality that they are obligated to follow.  Once again, this view is grounded 
in a conception of humans as intelligent beings who were created by God.  As 
Locke puts it in the Essay:  
The Idea of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness, and 
Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we 
depend; and the Idea of our selves, as understanding rational 
Beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly 
considered, and pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty 
and Rules of Action, as might place Morality amongst the 
Sciences capable of Demonstration: wherein I doubt not, but 
                                                        
126. Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 67, at 279. 
127. Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 51, at 266. 
128. Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 51–52, at 266–67. 
129. Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 48, at 264. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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from self-evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as 
incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the measures of right 
and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply 
himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the one, as 
he does to the other of these Sciences.132 
These principles of morality are what Locke calls “the Law of Nature and 
Reason.”133  This law, which represents the will of God insofar as humans can 
know it through natural reason, arises “from the Constitution of [their] very 
Nature” as “Rational Creature[s].”134  The law of nature determines one’s duties 
toward God, one’s neighbors, and oneself.135  In the following Parts, I explore 
the central roles that these ideas of natural law and reason play in Locke’s 
political and religious thought.   
IV. REASON, THE LAW OF NATURE, AND THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
Part III focused on Locke’s conception of the individual as a rational 
creature.  But while Locke regards humans as fundamentally individual beings, 
he also holds that God “designed Man for a sociable Creature,” who both needs 
and desires to live in “fellowship with those of his own kind” and who for this 
purpose is endowed “with Understanding and Language.”136  The question that 
arises is what it means for individuals to live together in “a Society of Rational 
Creatures.”137   
This is the central concern of Locke’s political philosophy as developed in 
the Second Treatise of Government.  The work’s immediate purpose is to justify 
popular resistance to the efforts of Charles II and James II to become absolute 
monarchs¾resistance that culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 1688–
1689, in which James was dethroned and replaced by William and Mary of 
Orange.138  To make his case for resistance and revolution, Locke seeks to 
                                                        
132. Id. bk. IV, ch. III, § 18, at 549; see also John Locke, Knowledge B (1681), in LOCKE: 
POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 281, 281–82 (asserting that “morality as well as mathematics [is] 
capable of demonstration”). 
133. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 96, at 332. 
134. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XI, at 119; see also id. ch. 
XV, at 169 (stating that God gave man “Reason, and with it a Law: That could not be otherwise than 
what Reason should dictate; Unless we should think, that a reasonable Creature, should have an 
unreasonable Law”).  
135. See LOCKE, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 12, qu. V, fol. 59–61, at 167–69. 
136. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. III, ch. I, § 1, at 402; LOCKE, 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 77, at 318–19. 
137. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 163, at 376. 
138. See The Preface to id., at 137; id. bk. II, § 222, at 412; id. bk. II, § 225, at 415; id. bk. II, 
§ 230, at 418.  On the political background of the Two Treatises, see ASHCRAFT, supra note 8, at 17. 
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determine the basic principles that apply to all legitimate governments.  His 
inquiry is a wide-ranging one, which draws on political observation,139 
economic theory,140 historical speculation,141 anthropological discussion,142 
biblical allusion,143 and classical learning.144  At its core, however, the Second 
Treatise is an effort to understand “the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil 
Government” by means of the same sort of rigorous logical analysis he 
espouses in the Essay.145  In this way, Locke hopes to determine what would 
motivate rational creatures to establish civil society and government; what 
functions and powers they would assign to the government; what limitations 
they would impose upon it; and what they are entitled to do if those limitations 
are violated.   
A. The State of Nature 
1. Freedom and Equality 
Locke begins his inquiry by “consider[ing] what State all Men are naturally 
in.”146  This “State of Nature” is more logical than historical: it is the condition 
that reason tells us human beings would be in before they made any positive 
agreements with one another.147  According to Locke, this condition is “a State 
of perfect Freedom,” in which individuals are entitled to control their own 
persons, actions, and possessions “as they think fit, within the bounds of the 
                                                        
139. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 230, at 417–18; id. bk. II, §§ 223–
25, at 414–15 (contending that the people generally are reluctant to change the forms of government 
to which they are accustomed, but that they inevitably resist oppression). 
140. See id. bk. II, §§ 34–51, at 291–302 (articulating a labor theory of value and arguing that 
the institution of private property and the invention of money promote economic well-being and 
development). 
141. See id. bk. II, § 105, at 336–37 (speculating that civil government commonly began with 
the rule of the father of an extended family). 
142. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 41, at 296–97; id. bk. II, § 43, at 298; id. bk. II, § 46, at 299–300; id. 
bk. II, § 65, at 310; id. bk. II, § 102, at 335; id. bk. II, § 105, at 337; id, bk. II, § 108, at 339–40 
(discussing the social, economic, and political conditions of the native peoples of North and South 
America).  
143. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 11, at 274 (alluding to the story of Cain and Abel in Genesis 4:1-16). 
144. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 102, at 334–35; id. bk. II, § 201, at 400; id. bk. II, § 237, at 423–24 
(referring to the history of ancient Greece and Rome).  
145. Title Page to id. bk. II, at 265; see supra text accompanying notes 132–35. 
146. Id. bk. II, § 4, at 269.  For the roots of Locke’s theory of the state of nature and the social 
contract in the Scholastic tradition, see 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 116–23, 154–66, 174–75 (1978); Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at 
75. 
147. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269; see id. bk. II, § 6, at 270–71. 
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Law of Nature.”148  In the language he uses elsewhere, these are the natural 
rights to life, liberty, and property or “Estate.”149   
According to Locke, the freedom of individuals “is grounded on [their] 
having Reason,” which enables them to direct their actions for their own good 
without encroaching upon the freedom of others.150  Because individuals are 
free, they are also equal, with no one being naturally subordinate to, or having 
a claim to “Dominion” over, anyone else.151 
2. The Law of Nature 
As Locke emphasizes, the natural freedom of individuals is not absolute or 
arbitrary but is bounded by law.  His discussion of this point deserves careful 
examination, for it constitutes his clearest articulation of the principles of the 
law of nature.  As he explains, although the state of nature is 
a State of Liberty, . . . it is not a State of Licence[:] though Man 
in that State have an uncontroleable Liberty, to dispose of his 
Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy 
himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but 
where some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it.  
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which 
obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all 
Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, 
Liberty, or Possessions.  For Men being all the Workmanship 
of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants 
of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order, and 
about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship 
they are, made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure.  
And being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one 
Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such 
Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one 
another, as if we were made for one anothers uses, as the 
inferior ranks of Creatures are for ours.  Every one as he 
is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station 
willfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation 
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to 
                                                        
148. Id. bk. II, § 4, at 269. 
149. Id. bk. II, § 87, at 323; id. bk. II, § 123, at 350. 
150. Id. bk. II, § 63, at 309; accord id. bk. II, § 57, at 305–06; id. bk. II, § 59–61, at 307–09; see 
supra text accompanying notes 120–31; infra text accompanying notes 152–53. 
151. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269. 
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preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do 
Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what 
tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb, 
or Goods of another.152 
Several vital points emerge from this passage.  First, Locke identifies the 
“Law of Nature” with “Reason.”153  Second, he deduces the obligations of this 
law from our status as rational creatures¾beings who were created by God and 
endowed with the same rational “Faculties,” and who thus are naturally free, 
“equal and independent.”154  Third, the law of nature imposes duties not only 
toward other individuals but also toward oneself and God.  For instance, a 
person who unjustifiably takes his own life commits a wrong against himself as 
well as his “Maker,” whose “Property” and “Workmanship” he is.155  Finally, 
the duties imposed by the law of nature are positive as well as negative in 
character.  Under that law, one is not merely forbidden to “harm” oneself or 
others; one is also “bound to preserve” all human beings as far as one can.156   
3. The Relationship Between Law and Freedom 
Although the law of nature constrains the conduct of individuals, Locke 
rejects the idea that law and freedom are antithetical.  Instead, he insists that the 
two are essential to, and inseparable from, one another.  In another crucial 
passage, he writes: 
Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the 
direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, 
and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those 
under that Law.  Could they be happier without it, the Law, as 
an useless thing would of it self vanish; and that ill deserves 
the Name of Confinement which hedges us in only from Bogs 
and Precipices.  So that, however it may be mistaken, the end 
of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge 
Freedom[.]  For in all the states of created beings capable of 
Laws, where there is no Law, there is no Freedom.  For Liberty 
is to be free from restraint and violence from others which 
cannot be, where there is no Law: But Freedom is not, as we 
are told, A Liberty for every Man to do what he lists: (For who 
could be free, when every other Man’s Humour might 
                                                        
152. Id. bk. II, § 6, at 270–71.  
153. Id. at 271. 
154. Id.  
155. Id.  
156. Id.  
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domineer over him?)  But a Liberty to dispose, and order, as he 
lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole Property, 
within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is; and 
therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but 
freely follow his own.157 
We can discern two distinct strands in this account of the relationship 
between law and freedom.  The first is that law directs free and rational beings 
to their true interest.  For example, the law of nature and reason forbids one to 
unjustifiably kill oneself or to enslave oneself to another.158  Although there is 
a sense in which these prohibitions restrict one’s freedom, in a deeper sense 
they promote it: just as one does not wish to fall into “Bogs” or over 
“Precipices,” so one does not truly want to engage in behavior that will injure 
oneself or impair one’s ability to pursue one’s own happiness, which Locke 
regards as the goal of all free action.159  This aspect of Locke’s argument echoes 
his position in the Essay that one’s freedom of choice is not diminished when 
one follows the course that reason indicates will promote one’s real 
happiness.160   
While the first strand of Locke’s argument focuses on the individual’s 
pursuit of happiness, the second focuses on interaction between individuals.  
Individuals cannot act freely if they are subject to violence from others.  By 
forbidding individuals to injure one another, the law not only secures their 
freedom from violence but also enables all of them to pursue their own well-
being.   
In this way, Locke’s account of the relationship between law and freedom 
combines two different ideas: (1) that law is consistent with freedom because it 
directs “a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest,” and (2) that law is 
consistent with freedom because it promotes “the general Good of [all] those 
[who are] under that Law.”161  Although Locke presents these two ideas as 
harmonious with one another, we can also discern some tension between them 
                                                        
157. Id. bk. II, § 57, at 305–06.  The definition of natural liberty that Locke rejects here¾the 
unrestricted ability to do what one likes¾is taken from Filmer.  See id. bk. II, § 22, at 283–84 & n; id. 
§ 57, at 306 & n; ROBERT FILMER, OBSERVATIONS UPON ARISTOTLES POLITIQUES (1652), in 
PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 55, at 235, 268, 275.  Thomas Hobbes takes a similar 
approach.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XXI, at 145–48 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1991) (1651).  For Filmer and Hobbes, liberty is opposed to law¾a position that they use to 
support their authoritarian theories of government.   
158. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 6, at 271; id. bk. II, § 23, at 284. 
159. Id. bk. II, § 57, at 305; see supra text accompanying notes 122–31. 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 129–31. 
161. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 57, at 305. 
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in cases where an individual rationally might believe that his own interest 
would be advanced by invading the rights of others.  As we shall see in Part IV, 
this problem turns out to be central to Locke’s account of religion, morality, 
and the law of nature.162   
4. The Relationship Between Law and Personality 
Just as Locke sees an essential relationship between law and freedom, he 
also holds that there is a basic connection between law and personality.  In the 
Essay, Locke uses the term person to describe a rational creature in its 
relationship to the law.  A person is “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason 
and reflection;” that is aware of its own identity over time; that is capable of 
knowing the law that it is under, especially the law of nature; that “owns and 
imputes to it self” the actions that it takes in relation to that law; and that is 
accountable to itself and others for those actions—an accountability that may 
take the form of rewards and punishments.163  In short, “Person . . . is a 
Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit [to an individual]; and 
so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and 
Misery.”164   
5. The Community of Nature 
Now that we have explored the relationships between law, freedom, and 
personality, let us return to Locke’s account of the state of nature.  At times, he 
characterizes this condition in highly individualistic terms.165  At other times, 
however, he portrays it as having a communal dimension.  For example, in the 
passage on the law of nature that we considered earlier, Locke indicates that, as 
members of a species who share the same “Faculties” and who are subject to 
the same law, human beings belong to “one Community,” which he calls the 
“Community of Nature.”166  Elaborating on this notion, he writes that, by giving 
                                                        
162. See infra text accompanying notes 249–54. 
163. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXVII, § 9, at 335; id. bk. II, 
ch. XXVII, § 26, at 346. 
164. Id. bk. II, ch. XXVII, § 26, at 346. 
165. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 123, at 350 (describing “Man in the 
State of Nature” as “absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject 
to no Body”). 
166. Id. bk. II, § 6, at 270–71; supra text accompanying note 152. 
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reason and the law of nature “to be the Rule” and “common bond” between 
human beings, God has “united [them] into one fellowship and societie.”167   
On this view, while the state of nature is “a State of perfect Freedom,”168 it 
is also a sort of social condition within which individuals interact in a positive 
way.  In Locke’s words, it is “a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, 
and Preservation” in which individuals “liv[e] together according to reason.”169 
6. Enforcing the Law of Nature 
When he describes the state of nature in this way, Locke is viewing it from 
a normative and logical perspective, as the condition that would obtain if 
individuals actually lived in accord with their nature as rational creatures.  In 
reality, however, their conduct often falls short of this ideal.  Instead, they are 
often tempted to pursue their own interests by invading the rights of others.170  
One who subjects others to “injury and violence” not only violates their rights 
but also commits “a trespass against the whole Species” by transgressing the 
law of nature and reason, “which is that measure God has set to the actions of 
Men, for their mutual security.”171   
But how can the law of nature be made effective in this situation?  Because 
there is no government in a state of nature, Locke argues that this law can be 
enforced only by the individuals themselves.172  As rational creatures, 
individuals are entitled to preserve themselves by judging and defending their 
own rights.173  They also have a right to act for the preservation of mankind by 
restraining and punishing those who violate the law of nature.174  And while 
human beings generally have a right to be free from violence, Locke holds that 
when offenders violate “the right Rule of Reason,” they degrade themselves 
below the level of rational creatures and may properly be punished in 
proportion to their crimes.175   
As Locke recognizes, however, the defects of this regime are obvious.  
First, “though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational 
                                                        
167. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, §§ 171–72, at 381–83; see also id. bk. II, § 128, 
at 352 (stating that under “the Law of Nature, . . . all . . . of Mankind are one Community, [and] make 
up one Society, distinct from all other Creatures”).   
168. Id. bk. II, § 4, at 269. 
169. Id. bk. II, § 19, at 280. 
170. See id. bk. II, § 123, at 350. 
171. Id. bk. II, §§ 8, 10 at 272–73. 
172. See id. bk. II, §§ 7–13, at 271–76. 
173. See id. bk. II, §§ 16–19, at 278–81; id. bk. II, § 91, at 327; id. bk. II, § 128, at 352. 
174. See id. bk. II, §§ 7–8, at 271–72; id. bk. II, § 12, at 274–75. 
175. Id. bk. II, §§ 10–12, at 273–75; id. bk. II, § 8, at 272. 
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Creatures,” it is not the sort of clearly defined and established rule that could 
effectively constrain those who are inclined to violate it out of ignorance or 
self-interest.176  Second, in a state of nature there is no impartial judge to resolve 
disputes under this law.177  And finally, individuals may lack sufficient power 
to enforce this law and bring offenders to justice.178  In short, while the rights 
of individuals in a state of nature are extensive in theory, in practice those rights 
would be extremely precarious.179   
B. The Social Contract and the Political Community 
Locke holds that, in view of these problems, rational individuals would 
choose to leave the state of nature.180  Using the capacities for “Understanding 
and Language” that God gave them for this purpose, they would make a social 
contract and form a civil society “for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, 
Liberties and Estates.”181   
Thus, on Locke’s view, the polity is “a Society of Rational Creatures, entred 
into a Community for their mutual good.”182  This conception lies at the heart 
of his political theory.  It enables him to identify the locus of political authority, 
the role that reason plays in its exercise, the ends and limits of that authority, 
and the remedies that are available when those limits are exceeded. 
In the state of nature, every individual has the power to determine when his 
rights are being violated and to defend them by force, as well as the power to 
punish offenses against himself and others.183  When individuals enter civil 
society, they transfer these powers to the community.184  It follows that all 
political authority originally belongs to people as a whole.185   
To be sure, this does not mean that the polity must be a pure democracy.  
While the community may choose to retain the supreme kind of political 
authority—the power of making laws—for itself, it may also choose to delegate 
this authority to “a few select Men” (in which case the government is “an 
Oligarchy”) or to an individual (in which case it is “a Monarchy”), or to 
                                                        
176. Id. bk. II, § 124, at 351. 
177. See id. bk. II, § 125, at 351. 
178. See id. bk. II, § 126, at 351. 
179. See id. bk. II, § 123, at 350. 
180. See id. bk. II, § 123, at 350; id. bk. II, § 127, at 352; id. bk. II, § 131, at 353. 
181. Id. bk. II, § 77, at 318–19; id. bk. II, § 123, at 350.   
182. Id. bk. II, § 163, at 376. 
183. See id. bk. II, § 7, at 271–72; id. bk. II, § 87, at 323–24; id. bk. II, § 91, at 327; id. bk. II, 
§ 128, at 352. 
184. See id. bk. II, §§ 87–89, at 323–25; id. bk. II, §§ 128–30, at 352–53. 
185. See id. bk. II, §§ 95–99, at 330–33; id. bk. II, § 132, at 354. 
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establish some “mixed Form[] of Government.”186  On Locke’s view, however, 
the people have good reason to entrust at least part of the lawmaking power to 
a body of elected representatives.187  Moreover, he holds that taxes may be 
imposed only with the consent of such a body or of the people themselves.188  
Above all, his theory is meant to demonstrate that all legitimate governments 
derive their power not from divine right but from the consent of the people.189 
Locke’s conception of the political community as “a Society of Rational 
Creatures” also highlights the essential role that reason should play in civil 
government.190  As we have seen, Locke holds that reason is the law that God 
has established to govern the actions of human beings, as well as the “common 
bond” that unites them into a community.191  In a state of nature, it falls to 
private individuals to determine what this law is and to enforce it against 
wrongdoers¾a regime that is bound to lead to “Confusion and Disorder.”192  
Within civil society, these functions are performed not by the “private 
judgement” of individuals but by the public judgment of the community or the 
government it has established.193  On this view, lawmaking draws upon the 
shared reason of the lawmakers, and it requires free deliberation and debate.194  
Likewise, adjudication involves the impartial application of reasonable laws 
that apply equally to all.195   
C. The Purposes and Limits of Government 
Locke also uses the concept of rationality to identify the purposes and limits 
of government.  Reason enjoins individuals to preserve themselves.196  Because 
they have no arbitrary power over their own lives, they cannot bestow such 
power on others, including their rulers.197  More generally, Locke observes that 
“no rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention 
                                                        
186. Id. bk. II, § 132, at 354. 
187. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 138, at 361 (contending that the property of subjects is more secure in 
governments where lawmakers are chosen for a period of time and then return to being “Subjects under 
the common Laws of their Country, equally with the rest”).   
188. Id. bk. II, §§ 138–40, at 360–62. 
189. See id. bk. II, § 112, at 343–44; id. bk. II, § 224, at 414–15.  
190. Id. bk. II, § 163, at 376. 
191. Id. bk. II, § 172, at 383. 
192. Id. bk. II, § 13, at 275–76.  
193. Id. bk. II, § 87, at 324.  
194. See id. bk. II, § 222, at 413. 
195. See id. bk. II, § 87, at 324; id. bk. II, § 131, at 353; id. bk. II, § 142, at 363.   
196. See id. bk. II, § 6, at 271. 
197. Id. bk. II, §§ 23–24 at 284–85; id. bk. II, § 135, at 357; id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; id. bk. 
II, § 172, at 382–83. 
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to be worse.”198  When individuals enter civil society, they do so “only with an 
intention in every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and 
Property.”199  It follows that the society and the government are required to use 
their power solely to protect the rights of citizens and to promote “the common 
good.”200   
In this way, Locke derives the basic principles of government from a 
rigorous analysis of the choices that rational individuals would make when they 
enter civil society.  An objective account of natural law yields the same 
conclusions: just as the law of nature in general wills “the Peace 
and Preservation of all Mankind,”201 “the first and fundamental natural Law” 
that applies to a particular society “is the preservation of the Society, and (as 
far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in it.”202 
D. Resistance and Revolution 
On these grounds, Locke condemns any theory¾such as divine right¾that 
holds that a ruler has absolute power over his people.203  If that were so, he 
writes, then 
the People under his Government are not a Society of Rational 
Creatures, entred into a Community for their mutual good; they 
are not such as have set Rulers over themselves, to guard, and 
promote that good; but are to be looked on as an Herd of 
inferiour Creatures, under the Dominion of a Master, who 
keeps them, and works them for his own Pleasure or Profit.  If 
Men were so void of Reason, and brutish, as to enter into 
Society upon such Terms, [the government might indeed 
have] . . . an Arbitrary Power to do things hurtful to the 
People.204 
But this position must be rejected, Locke argues, “since a Rational Creature 
cannot be supposed when free, to put himself into Subjection to another, for his 
own harm.”205  Instead, when the government violates the rights of its citizens, 
they must be allowed to question its actions without being accused of 
                                                        
198. Id. bk. II, § 131, at 353. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. bk. II, §§ 6–7, at 270–71. 
202. Id. bk. II, § 134, at 355–56. 
203. See id. bk. II, § 163, at 376–77.  
204. Id.  
205. Id. bk. II, § 164, at 377. 
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sedition.206  Moreover, individuals who are injured must be able to seek redress 
from the government or the courts.207  To deny them these rights is to treat them 
as though they “were degraded from the common state of Rational Creatures,” 
who must always be free to assert and defend their rights, whether by means of 
direct action in the state of nature or by an appeal to the law within civil 
society.208   
These considerations lead Locke to recognize natural rights of resistance 
and revolution against oppressive governments.  Under the law of nature and 
reason, he explains, “no Man, or Society of Men, hav[e] a Power to deliver up 
their Preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the Absolute Will and 
arbitrary Dominion of another.”209  Although one gives up some of one’s natural 
liberty in entering civil society, one cannot give up the right to judge whether 
one’s life or freedom are being threatened.210  If the government attempts to 
subject individuals to arbitrary power or unjust violence, they have a right to 
use force in their own defense.211  Of course, this is a last resort, for a central 
purpose of civil society is to enable people to resolve their disputes peacefully 
through an appeal to the law.212  But if the government injures individuals and 
at the same time leaves them with “no appeal on Earth to right them,” Locke 
holds that they are entitled to “appeal to Heaven”—that is, to use force in their 
own defense while trusting that God as the supreme judge will vindicate them 
at the last judgment.213   
What is true of individuals is also true of the people as a whole.  When they 
delegate political power to the government, they always retain the power to 
judge whether it is fulfilling its trust by acting only for the sake of individual 
rights and the common good.214  If the people determine that the government is 
abusing its power in an effort “to enslave, or destroy them,” they have a right 
to “appeal to Heaven,” to overthrow the government by force, and to establish 
a new one that will fulfill the purposes for which it was intended.215   
                                                        
206. See id. bk. II, §§ 92–93, at 327–28.   
207. See id. bk. II, § 20, at 281–82; id. bk. II, § 91, at 326–27.   
208. Id. bk. II, § 91, at 326–27; accord id. bk. II, §§ 19–21, at 280–82. 
209. Id. bk. II, § 149, at 367. 
210. See id. bk. II, § 23, at 284; id. bk. II, § 168, at 380. 
211. See id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; id. bk. II, § 208, at 404.  
212. See id. bk. II, §§ 20–21, at 280–81; id. bk. II, § 125, at 351.  
213. Id. bk. II, §§ 20–21, at 281–82; accord id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; id. bk. II, § 176, at 386; 
id. bk. II, § 242, at 427. 
214. See id. bk. II, § 149, at 367; id. bk. II, § 168, at 379; id. bk. II, § 240, at 426–27. 
215. Id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; accord id. bk. II, § 240–43, at 426–28. 
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V. REASON, FREEDOM, AND RELIGION 
As Part IV explained, Locke’s political philosophy is based on the principle 
that human beings are rational creatures who have an inherent right to think for 
themselves and to pursue their own happiness.  In the Two Treatises, Locke 
uses this principle to criticize absolute monarchy and to call for the 
establishment of civil institutions that are based on the consent of free and equal 
individuals.   In the Letter Concerning Toleration and other writings, Locke 
takes a similar approach to the religious realm.  Rejecting the authoritarianism 
of the Restoration regime, he argues that the government should have no power 
whatever over religion, but that all individuals have an inalienable right to 
freedom of belief and worship within religious institutions that they have 
voluntarily entered into.   
This Part examines Locke’s theory of religious freedom.  I begin by 
exploring his account of the nature of religion, focusing on the roles that faith 
and reason play within it.  I then explain how this account led Locke to argue 
for religious liberty and the separation of church and state. 
A. Locke’s Conception of Religion 
In the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke maintains that our concern for 
happiness is not limited to our well-being in this world, which is the object of 
civil government.216  Instead, every individual also “has an Immortal Soul, 
[which is] capable of Eternal Happiness or Misery.”217  To attain such 
happiness, an individual must “believ[e] and do[] those things in this Life, 
which are necessary to the obtaining of Gods Favour, and are prescribed by 
God to that end.”218  This is the sphere of religion.   
In many passages of the Letter, Locke uses the term faith to refer to the 
beliefs that individuals hold about God and religion.219  But a careful reading of 
these passages indicates that he often uses the term in a broad sense to refer to 
all theological beliefs, not only to those that are matters of faith in a strict sense, 
that is, the acceptance of truths that one believes God to have communicated 
through positive revelation.220  In this section, I first discuss theological beliefs 
that are based on reason and then turn to those based on revelation.  Finally, I 
                                                        
216. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45–47. 
217. Id. at 45. 
218. Id.  
219. See, e.g., id. at 13–14. 
220. See, e.g., id. at 14 (discussing the ways that people can seek to persuade others of religious 
truths by means of “Arguments,” “Evidence,” and “Reason”). 
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examine Locke’s distinctive teachings on the relationship between faith and 
reason. 
1. Reason 
As we have seen, Locke maintains that individuals can use reason to 
discover many of the most important truths about God and religion.221  First, 
people can demonstrate that God exists and that he is “eternal, most powerful, 
and most knowing.”222  Second, they can realize that as “intelligent, but frail 
and weak Being[s], made by and depending on another [Being], who is eternal, 
omnipotent, perfectly wise and good,” they ought to “honour, fear, and obey 
GOD.”223  Third, they can recognize that God has given them the law of nature 
and reason to live by—a law that arises from their constitution as rational 
creatures and that prescribes their duties to God, other human beings, and 
themselves.224  In short, human beings are capable of using “natural reason” to 
discern “that there is a God, and what is required by and will be acceptable to 
him thereby to avoid his anger and procure his favour.”225 
For Locke, these truths of “Natural Religion”226 lie at the core of all 
reasonable religion.  By using their minds to discern these truths, individuals 
come “to be rational creatures” who understand their own nature and their 
relationship with God.227  Natural religion teaches human beings how they can 
live a “Good Life” by developing moral and religious virtue, by following the 
law of nature, and by acting with “Charity . . . and Good-will in general towards 
all Mankind.”228  According to Locke, living such a life is “the best worship” 
of God and the main “Business of True Religion.”229  A good life is not only 
                                                        
221. See supra text accompanying notes 103–06. 
222. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. X, § 6, at 621.  
223. Id. bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 3, at 651; accord id. bk. IV, ch. XI, §§ 13–14, at 638 (explaining how 
reason can establish “universal” and “Eternal Truths,” including the proposition “That Men ought to 
fear and obey GOD”). 
224. See LOCKE, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 12, qu. V, fol. 61, at 169; LOCKE, 
REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XI, at 119.   
225. John Locke, Religion (1681), in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 278, 278–
79. 
226. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490. 
227. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 8, at 182; accord LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 3, at 651. 
228. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 8, 45; see also JOHN LOCKE, 
A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION (1692) (discussing the content of natural religion), in 5 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 139, 156 (12th ed. 1823) [hereinafter LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR 
TOLERATION]. 
229. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 8; LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR 
TOLERATION, supra note 228, at 156; see also John Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical Power (1674), in 
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vital for attaining salvation, it also contributes to the well-being of the 
commonwealth.230  In addition, because the truths of “natural religion 
and . . . morality” are founded upon reason rather than revelation, they are 
matters that the adherents of different religions can agree upon.231  Finally, he 
maintains that “the Precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible 
to all Mankind” by the “light of Reason,” while revelation is often contained in 
ancient texts that may be difficult to interpret.232  For all these reasons, he 
contends that the truths of natural religion should hold a central place in 
religious life.233   
Although it was powerful, Locke’s theory of natural religion was not 
without its difficulties.  One problem had to do with the status of the law of 
nature.  According to Locke, for something to be a law, it must not only express 
the will of a lawgiver but must also be enforced by means of rewards and 
punishments.234  Is that true of the law of nature?  In the Second Treatise, Locke 
contends that, in the state of nature, every individual has the power to enforce 
that law against wrongdoers, and that this function is taken over by the 
government within civil society.235  By these means, the law of nature is 
enforced in this world.  Yet this enforcement is imperfect in several important 
ways.  First, some wrongdoers may be too powerful for other people to bring 
to account.236  Second, Locke’s conception of the law of nature or “the Moral 
Law” goes far beyond what is needed to protect other individuals and the 
society.237  Instead, that law sets an ideal standard of virtue and goodness that 
arises from the nature of rational creatures.238  This law encompasses not only 
the duties that one owes to one’s fellow creatures but also the duties that one 
owes to oneself and God.239  Moreover, this law governs the inner life of 
                                                        
LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 216–17, 219 [hereinafter Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical 
Power] (referring to morality as the “real part of religion”). 
230. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45. 
231. John Locke, A Discourse of Miracles (1706), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 256, 261 
(12th ed. 1823); accord LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, at 156. 
232. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.  
233. See id. 
234. See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 8, at 87; id. bk. II, ch. XXVIII, §§ 5–6, at 351–52. 
235. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, §§ 7–13, at 271–76; id. bk. II, § 87, 
at 323–24; id. bk. II, §§ 128–30, at 352–53. 
236. See id. bk. II, § 126, at 351.  Of course, this can be especially true of rulers who abuse their 
power.  See id. bk. II, §§ 91–93, at 326–28; id. bk. II, § 137, at 359–60. 
237. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. III, at 20; accord id. ch. 
XIV, at 147–48. 
238. See id. ch. II, at 13–14; id. ch. XIV, at 147–48. 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 133–35. 
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individuals as well as their external conduct.240  In these ways, the natural or 
moral law “set[s] forth the Duties of a good Life in their full Obligation and 
Extent, beyond what . . . the Civil Laws of any Country could prescribe or take 
notice of.”241 
For Locke, then, the law of nature can be a true law only if it is enforced by 
rewards and punishments in another life.  In the Essay, he asserts that “it is 
evident” that God, who ordained that we should live in this world as “sensible 
intelligent Beings . . . can and will restore us to the like state of Sensibility in 
another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has 
designed to Men, according to their doings in this Life.”242 
What grounds do human beings have to believe in this future state of 
rewards and punishments?  At one point in the Essay, Locke offers a version of 
Pascal’s wager:  
He that will allow exquisite and endless Happiness to be but 
the possible consequence of a good Life here, and the contrary 
state the possible Reward of a bad one; must own himself to 
judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude, that a vertuous 
Life, with the certain expectation of everlasting Bliss, which 
may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of 
that dreadful state of Misery, which ‘tis very possible may 
overtake the guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain hope of 
Annihilation . . . .  [W]hen infinite Happiness is put in one 
Scale, against infinite Misery in the other; if the worst, that 
comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be the best that the 
wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, Who can without 
madness run the venture? 243 
As Locke concedes, however, this argument does not show that “a future Life” 
is certain or even probable.244  Instead, the argument merely contends that such 
                                                        
240. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XII, at 122–23 
(discussing the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5–7 and the Sermon on the Plain in Luke 6). 
241. Id. ch. IX, at 58.  In this passage, Locke is referring to the teachings of Christ¾teachings 
that Locke treats as largely identical to the law of nature and reason.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 273–75.   
242. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. III, § 6, at 542. 
243. Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 281–82.  On Pascal’s wager, see BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES 
§ 233 (W.F. Trotter trans., Dent 1910) (1660); Pascal’s Wager, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pascal-wager/ 
[https://perma.cc/LJN8-DQTY] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
244. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 282. 
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a life “is at least possible,” and that a rational person would act as though there 
were one.245   
More generally, Locke’s defense of a future state is based on the notion that 
“the great Ends of Morality and Religion” require it.246  On Locke’s view, 
morality and religion are based on the law of nature.247  But the law of nature 
can be a true law only if it is backed up by rewards and punishments in a future 
state.248  In the absence of this state, the entire Lockean structure of morality 
would collapse.   
One way to see this point is by recurring to the concept of a rational 
creature.  On one hand, a rational creature recognizes that he should live in 
peace and harmony with others according to reason, which forbids causing 
injury to others.249  Yet on the other hand, a rational creature necessarily pursues 
his own happiness.250  His motive for action is to attain pleasure and avoid 
pain,251 and this may lead him to engage in conduct that does injure others.  For 
Locke, the solution to this paradox is that God enforces the law of nature with 
rewards and punishments in a future life.252  By means of these incentives, 
rational creatures are led to pursue their own happiness in ways that are 
consonant with the happiness of all.  This is part of what Locke means when he 
says (in a passage that we looked at earlier) that “Law, in its true Notion, is not 
so much the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his 
proper Interest,” and that it “prescribes no farther than is for the general Good 
of those under that Law.”253  Through the incentives that it provides, the law 
brings the agent’s own “Interest” into alignment with “the general Good” of 
all.254   
Closely related to this argument from morality is an argument from desert, 
combined with a teleological view that God desires human beings to strive after 
the perfection of their rational nature, a condition that includes immortality.  As 
Locke puts it, “God has set some Things in broad day-light” and “has given us 
                                                        
245. Id. 
246. Id. bk. IV, ch. III, § 6, at 542. 
247. See supra text accompanying notes 222–41.  
248. See supra text accompanying notes 242–45. 
249. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 6, at 271. 
250. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 36–71, at 254–
84; id. bk. IV, ch. XXI, § 21, at 720–21.  
251. See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 41–42, at 258–59. 
252. See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 60, at 273–74; id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 281–82. 
253. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 57, at 305; supra text accompanying note 
157. 
254. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, bk. II, § 57, at 305.  
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some certain Knowledge,” in order to give us “a Taste of what intellectual 
Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Desire and Endeavor after a better 
State.”255  In this way, God encourages us to use our minds in “the twilight” of 
uncertainty by searching out “and following . . . that way, which might lead us 
to a State of greater Perfection.”256  On this view, Locke concludes, it is “highly 
rational to think, even were Revelation silent in the Case, That as Men employ 
those Talents, God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their 
Rewards at the close of the day, when their Sun shall set, and Night shall put 
an end to their Labours.”257 
2. Faith 
These are the main reasons that Locke offers for believing in a future state 
in which individuals will be rewarded or punished for their deeds on earth.  
Clearly, however, these considerations fall far short of rational demonstration 
or certainty.  Instead, at best they show that there is a greater or lesser 
probability of a future state.  This weakens the incentives that individuals have 
to live virtuous and pious lives in this world, as well as their hopes of attaining 
immortality and happiness in the next. 
On this ground, among others, Locke argues that there are benefits to 
moving beyond “pure Natural Religion” and embracing Christianity, a religion 
that is founded not only on reason but also on faith.258  In a strict sense, faith 
means the assent to a proposition not because it has been “made out by the 
Deductions of Reason,” but rather “upon the Credit of the Proposer, [that is] as 
coming from GOD” through “Revelation.”259 
Toward the end of The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke canvasses 
the advantages that come from the revelation contained in the New 
Testament.260  One of the chief advantages relates to the assurance of an afterlife 
with its attendant rewards and punishments.261  As he explains, it is hardly 
surprising that people did not choose to live a virtuous life at a time when its 
benefits seemed to be outweighed by its difficulties and costs: 
                                                        
255. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XIV, § 2, at 652. 
256. Id. 
257. Id.  The reference to “Revelation” seems to include Jesus’s parable of the talents, see 
Matthew 25:14–30; Luke 19:12–28, as well as his parable of the laborers who are paid at the end of the 
day, see Matthew 20:1-16.  
258. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. I, at 5; id. ch. III, at 17–
21.  
259. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 2, at 689. 
260. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XV, at 164–65.  
261. See id. ch. XIV, at 162–63.  
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Mankind, who are and must be allowed to pursue their 
Happiness; Nay, cannot be hindred; Could not but think 
themselves excused from a strict observation of Rules, which 
appeared so little to consist with their chief End, Happiness; 
Whilst they kept them from the enjoyments of [this] Life; And 
they had little evidence and security of another.262 
But all of this changed when Christ came and “brought life and immortality to 
light.”263  The classical philosophers had shown 
the beauty of Virtue: They set her off so as drew Mens Eyes 
and approbation to her: But leaving her unendowed, very few 
were willing to espouse her. . . . But now there being put into 
the Scales, on her side, An exceeding and immortal weight of 
Glory; Interest is come about to her; And Virtue now is visibly 
the most enriching purchase, and by much the best bargain.  
That she is the perfection and excellency of our Nature; That 
she is her self a Reward, and will recommend our Names to 
future Ages, is not all that can now be said [of] her . . . .  It has 
another relish and efficacy, to perswade Men that if they live 
well here, they shall be happy hereafter.  Open their Eyes upon 
the endless unspeakable joys of another Life; And their Hearts 
will find something solid and powerful to move them.  The 
view of Heaven and Hell, will cast a slight upon the short 
pleasures and pains of this present state; and give attractions 
and encouragements to Virtue, which reason, and interest, and 
the Care of ourselves, cannot but allow and prefer.264 
According to Locke, this is the only solid “foundation” for “Morality.”265 
Remarkably, Locke also maintains that revelation plays a vital role in 
identifying the content of natural law.  In the Essay, he had expressed optimism 
that reason was capable of working out the principles of morality with a quasi-
mathematical rigor.266  As he acknowledges in The Reasonableness of 
Christianity, however, in practice philosophers had never succeeded in 
                                                        
262. Id. ch. XIV, at 161. 
263. Id. ch. XIV at 162 (quoting 1 Timothy 1:10); accord JOHN LOCKE, MR. LOCKE’S REPLY TO 
THE RIGHT REVEREND THE LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER’S ANSWER TO HIS SECOND LETTER (1698), 
in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 191, 489 (new ed. 1823), supra note 228, at 191, 489. 
264. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 162–63 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting 2 Corinthians 4:17 (stating “eternal weight” rather than, as here, “immortal 
weight”)). 
265. Id. ch. XIV, at 163.  
266. See supra text accompanying note 132.  
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developing a full account of morality, at least in the times before Christ came.267  
And even if they had, their moral teaching would have lacked the binding 
authority that can derive only from a clear recognition that the moral law has 
been given by God and is backed with rewards and punishments.268   
On these grounds, Locke concludes that it seems to be “too hard a task for 
unassisted Reason, to establish Morality in all its parts, upon its true 
foundations; with a clear and convincing light”: “Natural Religion in its full 
extent, was no where, that I know, taken care of by the force of Natural 
Reason.”269  Instead, people’s “first knowledge of [these] truths . . . [is] owing 
to Revelation” as contained in the New Testament.270  These truths can be 
summed up in the “Golden Rule” articulated in the Sermon on the Mount¾“All 
things whatsoever ye would have that Men should do to you, do ye even so to 
them”271—as well as in the “great rule, that we should love our neighbour as 
ourselves”—a rule that Locke suggests is “such a fundamental truth for the 
regulating human society, that . . . by that alone one might without difficulty 
determine all the cases and doubts in social morality.”272 
On this view, it might seem that the law of God that is communicated by 
revelation supersedes the law of nature that is discovered through reason.  For 
Locke, however, these two laws are fundamentally the same.  Both represent 
the will of God, whether that will is revealed by Scripture or by the light of 
nature.273  The truths known through revelation are “agreeable to Reason” and 
“confirm[ed]” by reason.274  They are identical to the law that arises from our 
“very Nature” as rational creatures.275  For Locke, one of the most basic aspects 
of faith is the belief that the universe is rational and is governed by a good and 
just God276¾a belief that underlies his whole account of human nature and 
morality.   
                                                        
267. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 148–55.  
268. See id. ch. XIV, at 152–54.  
269. Id. ch. XIV, at 148. 
270. Id. ch. XIV, at 149. 
271. Id. ch. XII, at 123 (quoting Matthew 7:12). 
272. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 43, at 223 (paraphrasing Matthew 22:39 and Mark 
12:31). 
273. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. I, § 86, at 205; LOCKE, HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXVIII, § 8, at 352; id. bk. IV, ch. VII, § 11, at 598–99; 
id. bk. IV, ch. XIX, § 4, at 698; LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. III, 
at 18–21; id. ch. XIV, at 139–41, 147–59.  
274. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 149, 156. 
275. Id. ch. XI, at 119.   
276. See supra text accompanying notes 221–57.  
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3. The Relationship Between Faith and Reason 
As this discussion makes clear, Locke rejects the common view that faith 
is opposed to reason and can override the clear teachings of reason.277  
According to Locke, “Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind.”278  As 
“rational Creature[s],” individuals have a “Duty” to “regulate[]” their beliefs so 
that they are founded on “good Reason.”279  By contrast, one who “believes, 
without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; 
but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, 
who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep 
him out of Mistake and Errour.”280 
For Locke, this view has crucial implications for an approach to revelation.  
Where God has revealed a truth, one is absolutely bound to believe it, since it 
comes from a being who is all-knowing and incapable of lying or deceit.281  At 
the same time, however, reason imposes critical constraints on what one can 
believe.  First, although one must believe what God communicates through 
revelation, one must use reason to determine whether something counts as a 
revelation in the first place.282  For example, Locke contends that the miracles 
that Christ performed constitute irrefutable evidence that the New Testament 
constitutes a true revelation.283 
Second, reason sets bounds to the content of what can be accepted as 
revelation.  In this regard, Locke distinguishes between three kinds of 
propositions: those that are according to reason, those that are above reason, 
and those that are contrary to reason.284  Revelation can teach things that are 
“According to Reason,” such as the idea that God exists285 or the moral truths 
that are contained in the Gospel.286  In addition, revelation can teach things that 
are “Above Reason.”287  For example, while one’s natural faculties can tell one 
                                                        
277. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24, at 687–88; 
id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 11, at 696.  
278. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24, at 687.  
279. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24 at 687–88. 
280. Id. 
281. See id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 5, at 692; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 8, at 694. 
282. See id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 6, at 693; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 8, at 694; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, 
§ 10, at 695. 
283. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 142–43, 146–
47, 153.  
284. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687. 
285. See id.  For Locke’s argument that the existence of God is rationally demonstrable, see 
supra text accompanying notes 103–06. 
286. See supra text accompanying notes 273–75. 
287. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687. 
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nothing about the existence of spirits, the New Testament relates “that [a] part 
of the Angels rebelled against GOD, and thereby lost their first happy state.”288  
Similarly, Scripture teaches “that the dead shall rise, and live again” when 
Christ comes to judge the world.289 These things, “being beyond the Discovery 
of Reason, are purely Matters of Faith; with which Reason has, directly, 
nothing to do.”290 
By contrast, Locke insists that one cannot have faith in any supposed 
revelation that is “Contrary to Reason,” in the sense that it contradicts what is 
known “either by immediate intuition . . . or by evident deductions of 
Reason”291—a category that clearly appears to include the principles of the law 
of nature, which are discerned through reason.292  As he explains: 
Faith can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our 
Knowledge.  Because though Faith be founded on the 
Testimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing any Proposition 
to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the Truth of its being 
a divine Revelation, greater than our own 
Knowledge. . . . [For] we cannot tell how to conceive that to 
come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our Being, which if 
received for true, must overturn all the Principles and 
Foundations of Knowledge he has given us; render all our 
Faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent Part of his 
Workmanship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a 
Condition, wherein he will have less Light, less Conduct than 
the Beast that perisheth.293 
Finally, and for similar reasons, people must use reason when interpreting the 
words of a revelation, and strive to understand them in a way that is not contrary 
to reason.294  
                                                        
288. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 7, at 694; accord id. bk. IV, ch. XI, § 12, at 637.  
289. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 7, at 694. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 5, at 691.   
292. On these principles as deductions of reason, see supra text accompanying notes 132–35. 
293. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 5, at 692–93.  For 
an earlier statement of this position, see John Locke, Faith and Reason (1676), in LOCKE: POLITICAL 
ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 248, 249–50. 
294. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 8, at 694; cf. id. 
bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490 (urging that we should “be more careful and diligent in observing” the 
“plain, and very intelligible” “Precepts of Natural Religion,” which are found through the “light of 
Reason,” “and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations” 
of the “other revealed Truths” that are conveyed in obscure and difficult passages of Scripture). 
 
HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/18  4:02 PM 
2018] THE LIGHT OF NATURE 747 
   
 
Locke concludes by observing that, when faith keeps within its proper 
bounds, it causes no “violence or hindrance to Reason; which is not injured, or 
disturbed, but assisted and improved, by new Discoveries of Truth, coming 
from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge.”295  Understood in this way, faith 
is “nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.”296  By contrast, 
the belief that faith is opposed to reason is responsible for “those Absurdities, 
that fill almost all the Religions which possess and divide Mankind.”297  To the 
extent that this belief is accepted, “there will, in matter of Religion, be no room 
for Reason at all,” with the result that religion, which “ought most peculiarly to 
elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear 
most irrational, and more senseless than Beasts themselves.”298  
B. Religious Liberty and the Relationship Between Church and State 
Now that we have discussed Locke’s conception of religion, let us explore 
his theory of religious liberty and the relationship between church and state. 
1. Religious Liberty 
Locke holds that because individuals are rational creatures, they are 
inherently free.299  This freedom takes two forms that are relevant for present 
purposes.  First, as Locke indicates in the Second Treatise, individuals have 
what may be called external freedom, that is, the rights to enjoy life and liberty 
and to acquire and possess property in the external world.300  Second, as he 
emphasizes in A Letter Concerning Toleration, individuals have the liberty to 
believe and worship as they think fit.301   
In a state of nature, individuals possess both forms of freedom.  Precisely 
because life, liberty, and property are external, however, they are vulnerable to 
attack by others.302  Although individuals are entitled to use force to protect 
themselves from aggression, in practice they will often lack the strength to do 
so.303  For this reason, Locke holds that rational individuals would agree to give 
                                                        
295. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 10, at 695. 
296. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 14, at 668. 
297. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 11, at 696. 
298. Id. 
299. See supra text accompanying note 150.  
300. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269; id. bk. II, § 6, at 271; id. bk. II, 
§ 123, at 350. 
301. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 15–17, 32–33, 38, 47–48, 
53, 58–59. 
302. See id. at 46–47. 
303. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 126, at 351. 
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up some of their external freedom and enter into civil society for the protection 
of their life, liberty, and property.304 
By contrast, Locke contends that when they make the social contract, 
rational individuals would not give up any of their religious liberty or grant the 
government any power over religious matters.305  Nor can it be shown that God 
or the law of nature have conferred any such power on the government.306  It 
follows that while the government may use force to regulate the external 
conduct of individuals toward one another, it may not use force to interfere with 
their liberty of worship or belief.307   
Before considering the arguments that Locke makes for this position, it will 
be helpful to briefly describe his views on the nature of belief and knowledge.  
According to Locke, belief and knowledge are partly “voluntary” and partly 
“necessary.”308  One can freely decide whether to look in a particular direction 
or to turn one’s thoughts to the consideration of a particular matter.309  Having 
done so, however, what one comes to see or know is not a matter of choice.  As 
Locke explains: 
[A]ll that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing, or 
with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that sort of 
Objects, and a more, or less accurate survey of them: But they 
being employed, our Will hath no Power to determine the 
Knowledge of the Mind one way or other; that is done only by 
the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered.310 
The same thing is true of matters that are the subject of faith or opinion rather 
than of knowledge.311 
With this background, let us explore Locke’s claim that when rational 
individuals form civil society, they would not surrender their religious liberty 
or accord the government any power over religious matters.  In A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, Locke makes several arguments for this position. 
(1) The inalienability of religious liberty—Locke’s leading argument is that 
individuals would not give the ruler or “the Civil Magistrate” any authority over 
religion 
                                                        
304. See id. bk. II, §§ 87–89, at 323–25; id. bk. II, §§ 127–31, at 352–53. 
305. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13. 
306. See id.; LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. II, at 202. 
307. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 12–15, 46–47. 
308. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 1, at 650. 
309. See id. bk. IV, ch. XIII, §§ 1–2, at 650. 
310. Id. bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 2, at 650–51.  
311. See id. bk. IV, ch. XV, § 5, at 656; id. bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 1, at 657–58; id. bk. IV, ch. XVI, 
§ 9, at 663. 
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because no man can so far abandon the care of his own 
Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, 
whether Prince or Subject, to prescribe to him what Faith or 
Worship he shall embrace.  For no Man can, if he would, 
conform his Faith to the Dictates, of another.  All the Life and 
Power of true Religion consists in the inward and full 
perswasion of the mind: And Faith is not Faith without 
believing.  Whatever Profession we make, to whatever outward 
Worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own 
mind that the one is true, and the other well pleasing unto God; 
such Profession and such Practice, far from being any 
furtherance, are indeed great Obstacles to our Salvation.312 
This argument rests on the notion that we are rational creatures who seek 
happiness not only in this world but also in the world to come.313  To attain 
salvation, we must use our minds to discover the truth about God and the path 
he wants us to follow.  The freedom to do this is inalienable, for as a rational 
creature I can never “abandon the care of [my] own Salvation,” nor can I allow 
anyone else to do my thinking for me.314  To do so would not only be in inherent 
conflict with my nature as an intelligent being, it would also be futile, for the 
act of believing can be effective only if I engage in it myself, and I can gain no 
benefit from beliefs that I do not actually hold.315  Moreover, I could not 
“conform [my] Faith to the Dictates, of another” even if I wanted to, since what 
one believes is not voluntary, but is determined by the objects that one 
considers.316  For these reasons, the magistrate can derive no power over 
religion from “the Consent of the People” when they enter civil society.317  And 
according to Locke, revelation points in the same direction, for “it appears not 
that God has ever given any such Authority to one Man over another, as to 
compell any one to his Religion.”318 
                                                        
312. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13. 
313. See id. at 13, 15, 45–47; LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. 
XIV, at 161–63; Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, supra note 229, at 216–19. 
314. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13. 
315. For an earlier expression of this point, see Locke, Toleration A, supra note 72, at 232. 
316. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13; see supra text 
accompanying notes 308-11.  
317. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13.  An earlier version of 
this inalienability argument appears in the unpublished essay on toleration that Locke wrote in 1667.  
See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION (1667), in AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS ON LAW AND POLITICS 1667–1683, at 267, 272 (J. R. Milton & 
Philip Milton eds., Clarendon Press 2006) [hereinafter LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION]. 
318. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13. 
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(2) The inefficacy of force—The notion that belief is involuntary also plays 
an important part in Locke’s second argument for rejecting governmental 
authority over religious belief.  The magistrate can have no such authority, 
Locke writes,   
because his Power consists only in outward force: But true and 
saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind; 
without which nothing can be acceptable to God.  And such is 
the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be compell’d to 
the belief of any thing by outward Force.  Confiscation of 
Estate, Imprisonment, Torments, nothing of that Nature can 
have any such Efficacy as to make Men change the inward 
Judgment that they have framed of things.319  
Instead, “[i]t is only Light and Evidence that can work a change in Mens 
Opinions.”320  To put it another way, “it is absurd that things should be enjoyned 
by Laws, which are not in mens power to perform.  And to believe this or that 
to be true, does not depend upon our Will.”321 
(3) The fallibility of rulers—Locke further argues that even if the magistrate 
did have effective means to alter the beliefs of individuals, that “would 
not . . . help at all to the Salvation of their Souls,” for the magistrate has no 
more insight into religious truth than his subjects do.322  It would therefore be 
senseless to require them “to quit the Light of their own Reason; to oppose the 
Dictates of their own Consciences; and blindly to resign up themselves to the 
Will of their Governors, and to the Religion, which either Ignorance, Ambition, 
or Superstition had chanced to establish in the Countries where they were 
born.”323  Instead, Locke asserts that “Truth certainly would do well enough, if 
she were once left to shift for her Self.”324 
In the Letter, Locke makes points (2) and (3) in objective terms: because 
force is incapable of changing minds and civil rulers have no special insight 
into religious matters, it is objectively unreasonable to hold that those rulers 
have any power in the religious sphere.  But it is easy to see how these two 
points can also be recast to support Locke’s claim that rational individuals 
would not grant such power to civil rulers.  In some of his other writings, Locke 
does suggest arguments of this sort.  For example, in the Third Letter for 
                                                        
319. Id. at 13.  
320. Id. at 14. 
321. Id. at 44; accord LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 272. 
322. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 14–15, 28. 
323. Id. at 14–15. 
324. Id. at 45. 
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Toleration, he intimates that the people would not grant such power, for the use 
of that power by fallible magistrates would cause “much more harm than 
good . . . towards the propagating the true religion in the world.”325 
(4) The lack of injury to others—Finally, Locke argues that religious belief 
and worship are beyond the government’s power because they cause “no 
Injury” to others.326  As he explains more fully in the Third Letter, individuals 
would form a commonwealth solely to protect themselves against such injuries 
as could be prevented only by force, since other ends could be pursued equally 
well through nonpolitical forms of society.327  “Now since no man, or society 
of men, can by their opinions in religion, or ways of worship, do any man who 
differed from them any injury,” Locke contends, “the punishing any opinion in 
religion or ways of worship by the force given the magistrate, could not be 
intended by those who constituted or entered into the commonwealth.”328  On 
the contrary, because everyone in a state of nature has a right to be free from 
force in matters of religion, “protection from such injury is one of the ends of a 
commonwealth, and so every man has a right to toleration.”329 
For all these reasons, Locke concludes “that Liberty of Conscience is every 
mans natural Right” and that individuals retain this right when they enter 
society.330  The magistrate has no authority to restrict religious liberty but 
instead has a duty to tolerate the adherents of all religions (with the exceptions 
discussed below) and to protect their civil rights by means of equal laws.331   
Moreover, Locke holds that the duty of toleration is not confined to the 
magistrate but extends to everyone in the society.  In an important passage, he 
writes that no church or 
private Person has any Right, in any manner, to prejudice 
another Person in his Civil Enjoyments, because he is of 
another Church or Religion.  All the Rights and Franchises that 
                                                        
325. LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. II, at 213. 
326. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 37; accord id. at 20, 41, 44–
45; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 274; Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical 
Power, supra note 259, at 219; John Locke, Critical Notes upon Edward Stillingfleet’s Mischief and 
Unreasonableness of Separation (n.d.), in WRITINGS ON RELIGION 73, 74–75, ms. at 76 (Victor Nuovo 
ed., 2002) [hereinafter Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet].  
327. See LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. II, at 212. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 53; see also LOCKE, ESSAY 
CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 271, 275 (contending that “in speculations & 
religious worship every man hath a perfect uncontrould liberty” and “an absolute & universall right 
to toleration”). 
331. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 12–15, 57. 
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belong to him as a Man, or as a Denison, are inviolably to be 
Preserved to him.  These are not the Business of Religion.  No 
Violence nor Injury is to be offered him, whether he be 
Christian or Pagan.  Nay, we must not content our selves with 
the narrow Measures of bare Justice.  Charity, Bounty, and 
Liberality must be added to it.  This the Gospel enjoyns; this 
Reason directs; and this that natural Fellowship we are born 
into requires of us.  If any man err from the right way, it is his 
own Misfortune, no Injury to thee: Nor therefore art thou to 
punish him in the things of this Life, because thou supposest 
he will be miserable in that which is to come.332 
This passage highlights several points that are essential for understanding 
Locke’s view.  First, the duty of toleration applies to private parties as well as 
to the government.  Second, this duty comprises not merely a negative 
obligation to refrain from harming others on account of religion, but also a 
positive injunction to treat them with “Charity” and “Liberality.”333  Third, this 
duty is said to arise from “the Gospel” as well as from “Reason” and from 
membership in the natural community of mankind.334  In this way, Locke 
equates the revealed law of God with the law of nature and reason.  This is 
consistent with his view that reason and revelation have the same content, as 
well as his view that the law of nature includes both positive and negative 
obligations.335  Fourth, because the duty of toleration arises from the law of 
nature as well as from the Gospel, that duty is not limited to “the mutual 
Toleration of Christians in their different Professions of Religion,” as he puts it 
at the outset of the Letter.336  Instead, the duty also extends to the members of 
other religions, including the “Pagan[s]” he refers to here, as well as the Jews 
and Muslims he discusses elsewhere.337  Finally, all of this underscores the 
broader point that Locke’s argument in the Letter is based on natural religion 
and natural rights as much as on Christian theology. 
So far, we have been focusing on the arguments that Locke makes for 
religious toleration based on the inherent liberty of individuals.  But the subject 
can also be approached from the standpoint of their inherent duties.  Under the 
                                                        
332. Id. at 20.   
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. See supra text accompanying notes 156, 273–75. 
336. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 7. 
337. See id. at 58–59 (“[N]either Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from 
the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because of his Religion.”).  For an exploration of Locke’s view, 
see MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, ch. 19, at 593. 
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law of nature, individuals are bound to worship God and to obey his will.338  
Because their eternal happiness depends on believing and doing the things that 
God has prescribed, “the observance of these things is the highest Obligation 
that lies upon Mankind, and . . . our utmost Care, Application, and Diligence, 
ought to be exercised in the Search and Performance of them.”339  An individual 
who adheres to erroneous beliefs or modes of worship causes no injury to 
anyone else.340  It follows that no one has a right to interfere with such worship 
or belief, which are matters solely between oneself and God.341  If the magistrate 
should attempt to do so, one has not only a right but a duty to follow one’s own 
conscience, “[f]or Obedience is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to 
the Laws.”342  In this way, the “Liberty” that individuals have in religious 
matters can also be seen as a function of their duty towards God.343 
2. The Separation of Church and State 
For Locke, the same considerations that support the protection of religious 
liberty also mandate the separation of church and state.  Indeed, these principles 
are merely two sides of the same coin.  Because religious liberty is an inherent 
and inalienable right, rational individuals would not cede any of it to the polity 
when they make the social contract and establish civil government.344  It follows 
that “the whole Jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only to [the Civil Interests 
of its members] . . . ; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be 
extended to the Salvation of Souls.”345   
Instead, that concern lies within the sphere of religious societies or 
churches.  In opposition to the traditional view which was embraced by the 
Restoration religious and political order, Locke insists that “No Man by nature 
is bound unto any particular Church or Sect, but every one joins himself 
voluntarily to that Society in which he believes he has found that Profession 
and Worship which is truly acceptable unto God.”346  As a “free and voluntary 
Society,” a church has the power to make rules to govern itself as well as to 
                                                        
338. See supra text accompanying note 223.  
339. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45. 
340. See id. at 45–46. 
341. See id.; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 271–75; Locke, 
Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 73–75, ms. at 19, 76.  
342. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 48. 
343. Id. at 47–48.  For a persuasive argument to this effect, see Harris, supra note 8. 
344. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13. 
345. Id. at 12–13. 
346. Id. at 15; accord Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 75, ms. at 78. 
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establish its own articles of faith and forms of worship.347  When individuals 
deviate from the doctrine or discipline of the church to which they belong, it 
may respond with persuasion, admonition, and ultimately excommunication.348  
But the church may not use any force against its members or deprive them of 
their civil goods, let alone “persecute others, and force [them] by Fire and 
Sword, to embrace her Faith and Doctrine.”349  Civil goods belong to 
individuals as human beings and as members of the commonwealth; those 
goods are within the jurisdiction and the protection of the civil magistrate and 
may not be invaded on grounds of religion.350   
For these reasons, Locke holds that the commonwealth and the church (or 
rather churches) must be regarded as “absolutely separate and 
distinct . . . .  Societies; which are in their Original, End, Business, and in every 
thing, . . . infinitely different from each other.”351  The state is empowered to 
use force to promote the happiness of individuals in this world, while churches 
use spiritual means to promote their happiness in the world to come.352 
3. Conclusion 
In sum, the Lockean defense of religious toleration is rooted in the idea that 
human beings are rational creatures.  Locke argues that they must be free to use 
their own minds to seek the truth that leads to salvation, and he uses this 
argument to undermine the authoritarianism of the Restoration order.   
These points can be clearly seen in the extended, and increasingly 
acrimonious, debate that took place between Locke and his most acute critic on 
toleration, the Oxford don Jonas Proast.353  In a 1690 critique of the Letter 
Concerning Toleration,  Proast acknowledged that individuals could be saved 
by “true religion” only if they actually believed it to be true, and he also granted 
“that reason and arguments are the only proper means whereby to induce the 
mind to assent” to truth.354  For Proast, however, it did not follow that 
individuals should be left free in matters of religion:  
For if men, in choosing their religion, are . . . generally 
                                                        
347. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 16–20, 32–33, 44–45. 
348. See id. at 18–20. 
349. Id. at 17–19. 
350. See id. at 19.  
351. Id. at 24. 
352. See id. at 12, 15–16, 24, 45–48. 
353. For some recent explorations of this debate, see VERNON, supra note 8; Goldie, Religious 
Toleration, supra note 8. 
354. JONAS PROAST, THE ARGUMENT OF THE LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, BRIEFLY 
CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED (1690), in LOCKE ON TOLERATION, supra note 69, at 54–55. 
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subject, . . . when left wholly to themselves, to be so much 
swayed by prejudice and passion, as either not at all, or not 
sufficiently to regard the reasons and motives which ought 
alone to determine their choice; then it is in every man’s true 
interest, not to be left wholly to himself in this matter, but that 
care should be taken, that in an affair of so vast a concern to 
himself, he may be brought even against his own inclination, 
if it cannot be done otherwise (which is ordinarily the case) to 
act according to reason and sound judgement.355 
On these grounds, Proast argued that the civil magistrate must have the power 
to enforce the “spiritual authority” of the Anglican clergy by requiring their 
flock “to pay them reverence and due submission,” as well as by compelling 
dissenters to “rethink” their views and to open their minds to consider the 
teachings of the established church, where they will find the “truth which must 
save them.”356  
As Locke observed, however, Proast’s argument that individuals could be 
forced to consider the reasons for their religious beliefs was meant to apply only 
to dissenters, not to those who conformed to the established church.357  In effect, 
then, dissenters were being punished for the beliefs they held and not for their 
failure to consider reasons and arguments.358  Reasonable people could differ 
about what beliefs were true; to impose one’s views on others amounted to an 
assertion of infallibility.359  There was no basis to believe that the magistrate 
was more free from passion and prejudice than his subjects, or more concerned 
for the welfare of their souls.360  For these reasons, Locke concluded, I am 
entitled to use “my [own] reason . . . to examine and judge” for myself in 
religious matters and to care for my own soul.361  At bottom, Locke’s position 
was that the authoritarian religious order that Proast defended failed to respect 
individuals as rational creatures who were capable of using their minds to 
pursue religious truth and salvation, and who all had an equal claim to do so.362  
                                                        
355. Id. at 63–64. 
356. Id. at 60–63. 
357. See JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), in 5 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN LOCKE 59, 93–97 (12th ed. 1823) [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION]. 
358. See id. at 74–75. 
359. See id. at 89–91. 
360. Id. at 135–36. 
361. Id. at 89, 127, 132, 135–36; accord Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 75–77, 
ms. at 86. 
362. See LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 357, at 131, 133 
(maintaining that “the laws of the state [ought to be] made . . . equal to all the subjects, without 
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As Locke had put the point more than two decades earlier, to compel religious 
belief by force would invade “the liberty of that part where in lyes the dignity 
of a man, which could it be imposd on would make him but little different from 
a beast.”363 
C. The Limits of Religious Liberty and Toleration 
1. Religious Liberty 
Although the rights of religious liberty and toleration are broad, they are 
not absolute.  As we have seen, the government may not mandate the religious 
beliefs that individuals or churches should hold or the forms of worship they 
should engage in.364  Likewise, the government would exceed its authority if it 
relied on religious grounds to restrict religious belief, worship, or practice.365   
On Locke’s view, however, the government may properly rely on civil 
grounds to regulate the external conduct that individuals engage in, even when 
they do so for religious reasons.366  The most clear-cut situation involves 
conduct that itself violates the law of nature or the rights of others.  Thus, 
religious rituals that involve child sacrifice are no more protected than any other 
kind of murder.367  Moreover, as we have seen, Locke contends that religious 
liberty does not permit one to inflict “Violence [or] Injury” on others on account 
of religion.368  To do so would violate their natural and civil rights to life, 
liberty, and property as well as their own religious freedom.369  In this way, the 
same law of nature that protects religious liberty also establishes the limits of 
that liberty. 
More broadly, Locke holds that while the government may not target 
religious conduct as such, it may require all individuals to comply with general 
laws made for the public good.370  For example, if individuals are generally 
permitted to slaughter livestock, the government may not ban the sacrifice of 
                                                        
distinction of men of different professions in religion”).  Locke was not alone in taking this position.  
For example, as Richard Ashcraft has shown, during the 1670s, dissenting theologians also criticized 
the Anglican religious order for failing to treat individuals as rational beings, and they developed a 
theory of religion and liberty that anticipated Locke’s.  See ASHCRAFT, supra note 8, at 49–69. 
363. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 293–94. 
364. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 33, 44–45. 
365. See id. at 37–38, 48–49. 
366. See id. at 37–38. 
367. See id. at 37. 
368. Id. at 20. 
369. See id. at 20, 23. 
370. See id. at 37–38. 
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calves in religious ceremonies.371  By contrast, if the public interest required the 
government to prohibit all slaughter of calves for a period of time in order to 
rebuild the stock after a plague, religious liberty would afford believers no right 
to an exemption from this ban.372   
For Locke, both of these cases are governed by the same principle of 
separation of religion and state.  On one hand, the state may not intrude into the 
religious realm by restricting conduct on religious grounds, such as the belief 
that it is idolatrous.373  But on the other hand, jurisdiction over civil matters 
belongs to the state, and it would undermine the integrity of the civil realm if 
religious believers were entitled to demand exemption from general laws made 
for the common good.374  For Locke, then, the state and religion are both 
autonomous spheres that are governed by their own principles, within the larger 
framework of the law of nature.   
Locke maintains that, if state officials conscientiously avoid religious 
considerations and direct their actions to the public good, the laws that they 
make will rarely conflict with “the Conscience of a private Person.”375  If such 
a case were to arise, however, Locke’s solution is that the 
Person is to abstain from the Action that he judges unlawful; 
and he is to undergo the Punishment, which . . . is not unlawful 
for him to bear.  For the private Judgment of any Person 
concerning a Law enacted in Political Matters, for the publick 
Good, does not take away the Obligation of that Law, nor 
deserve a Dispensation.376  
This position accords with Locke’s account of the social contract in the Second 
Treatise, which holds that when individuals enter civil society, they give up the 
unrestricted right to act on their own “private Judgment” and agree to submit to 
the public judgment of the community or the government, who are entrusted 
with the power to act for the good of all.377   
As Locke emphasizes, however, that power is limited to civil affairs.  By 
contrast, for the reasons we have discussed, an individual can never give up his 
                                                        
371. Id. at 37.  
372. Id. at 37–38. 
373. See id. at 38–39. 
374. See id. at 37–38, 48. 
375. Id. at 48. 
376. Id. 
377. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, §§ 87–89, at 323–25. 
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“supreme and absolute Authority of judging for himself” in religious matters.378  
Thus, just as “the private Judgment of any particular Person, if erroneous, does 
not exempt him from the obligation of Law, so the private Judgment (as I may 
call it) of the Magistrate does not give him any new Right of imposing Laws” 
that go beyond his legitimate authority by injuring individuals on account of 
religion, or by enriching or favoring one religious group at the expense of 
others.379  In language that recalls his account of an “appeal to Heaven” in the 
Second Treatise,380 Locke suggests that when individuals are subjected to 
oppression on account of religion, they are entitled  “to resist Force with Force, 
and to defend their natural Rights . . . with Arms as well as they can,” while 
trusting that their actions will ultimately be vindicated by “God, . . . the only 
Judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the last day according 
to his Deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness, in 
endeavouring to promote Piety, and the publick Weal and Peace of 
Mankind.”381 
2. Religious Toleration 
Locke also holds that some kinds of beliefs fall wholly outside the principle 
of toleration.  The first category consists of religious doctrines that “manifestly 
undermine the Foundations of Society” or “those moral Rules which are 
necessary to the preservation of Civil Society.”382  As he explains, examples of 
these are rare, for any church that openly embraced such doctrines would 
endanger its own interest and reputation.  Instead, it is more common for people 
“arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own Sect, some peculiar 
Prerogative, covered over with a specious shew of deceitful words, but in effect 
opposite to the Civil Right of the Community.”383  For example, those who 
teach “that Faith is not to be kept with Hereticks” imply that they are entitled 
to break agreements with those they consider unorthodox, while those who 
                                                        
378. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45–46; accord id. at 13, 
48; LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. I, at 187–88, 196–97; ch. III, at 251; 
see also supra text accompanying notes 312–18.  For an illuminating account of the concept of private 
judgment in sixteenth and seventeenth-century radical Protestant thought, and the role that this concept 
played in Locke’s theory of religious liberty, see MILLER, supra note 7, at 75–85. 
379. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
380. See supra text accompanying note 210–13. 
381. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 60, 49; see also LOCKE, 
ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 295–96; id. at 275, n. line 19 (suggesting, in a 
handwritten passage, that individuals may lawfully defend themselves against the magistrate by force 
in this situation). 
382. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 49–50. 
383. Id. at 50. 
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maintain “That Dominion is founded in Grace . . . do plainly lay claim to the 
possession of all things,” including governmental power.384  Those who hold 
such beliefs, Locke writes, and who thus 
attribute unto the Faithful, Religious and Orthodox; that is, in 
plain terms, unto themselves; any peculiar Priviledge or Power 
above other Mortals, in Civil Concernments; or who, upon 
pretence of Religion, do challenge any manner of Authority 
over such as are not associated with them in their Ecclesiastical 
Communion; I say these have no right to be tolerated by the 
Magistrate; as neither those that will not own and teach the 
Duty of tolerating All men in matters of meer Religion.  For 
what do all these and the like Doctrines signifie, but that those 
Men may, and are ready upon any occasion to seise the 
Government, and possess themselves of the Estates and 
Fortunes of their Fellow-Subjects; and that they only ask leave 
to be tolerated by the Magistrate so long, until they find 
themselves strong enough to effect it?385 
Again, this position is best understood by reference to Locke’s broader 
understanding of the law of nature.  By that law, all individuals are inherently 
equal.386  When they enter into the social contract, they become equal members 
of the political community, which is obligated to protect the rights of all through 
equal laws.387  If religious groups “arrogate to themselves” greater rights or 
prerogatives than they allow to others, they violate the principles of equality 
and respect which constitute “the Foundations of Society” as well as “the moral 
Rules which are necessary to the preservation of Civil Society.”388  In this way, 
they transgress “the first and fundamental natural Law” which mandates “the 
preservation of the Society” and all of its members.389  Moreover, it is only 
reasonable that those whose rights are threatened should be entitled to protect 
themselves against this threat.   
It may seem that, in taking this position, Locke allows the claims of civil 
society to override those of religious belief.  As we have seen, however, Locke 
                                                        
384. Id. at 50–51. 
385. Id. at 51. 
386. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269; id. bk. II, § 6, at 271. 
387. See id. bk. II, § 22, at 284; bk. II, § 142, at 363. 
388. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 49–50.  For a discussion of 
the duty to respect the humanity and rights of others in Lockean thought, see Steven J. Heyman, A 
Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy Over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 59–61 (2015). 
389. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 134, at 355–56. 
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holds that, as rational creatures, individuals cannot properly adopt religious 
beliefs that are contrary to reason, including the principles of the law of 
nature.390  Those principles are violated by beliefs that seek to subordinate 
others on religious grounds.  It follows that those who hold such beliefs cannot 
reasonably claim that the failure to respect them violates any legitimate claim 
to religious freedom. 
Second, Locke would deny toleration to any church that is so constituted 
“that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to 
the Protection and Service of another Prince”¾a position that would conflict 
with the allegiance that they owe to their own sovereign.391  Locke offers the 
example of a Muslim who is bound to follow a religious leader who himself is 
wholly “obedient to the Ottoman Emperor.”392  Many contemporary readers 
would have understood this illustration to be a veiled way of describing 
Catholics who were obedient to the Pope, who claimed both religious and civil 
authority.393  However, while this passage of the Letter is sometimes understood 
to deny toleration to all Muslims and Catholics, it can also be read to allow for 
the toleration of these groups so long as they separate their religious beliefs 
from the political obligations that would arise from a commitment to religious 
authorities who also claim political power.394  Other passages suggest that this 
is Locke’s position.395 
On the other hand, Locke unequivocally rejects toleration for atheists.396  
Because they do not accept religion, they have no basis for a claim to religious 
toleration.397  More fundamentally, he asserts that “Promises, Covenants, and 
Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold upon an 
Atheist.”398  To readers today, this position may seem not only harsh but 
incomprehensible, and it is also in tension with Locke’s view that laws that 
                                                        
390. See supra text accompanying notes 291–93. 
391. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 52.   
392. Id. 
393. See MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, at 690.  As Marshall notes, 
Locke’s statements that toleration should be denied to those who maintain that “faith is not to be kept 
with heretics,” id. (quoting LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 50), and that 
“kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms,” id. (quoting LOCKE, LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 50), also would have been taken to refer to Catholics.  Id.   
394. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 52 n.137 (editor’s note); 
MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, at 691–92.  
395. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 58–59 (contending that 
“Mahumetan[s]” are entitled to toleration). 
396. See id. at 52–53. 
397. Id. at 53. 
398. Id. at 52–53. 
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punish individuals for their beliefs are neither effective nor legitimate.  On the 
other hand, it is easy to see how Locke’s position accords with his fundamental 
premise that morality is rooted in the duty to obey God, who establishes the law 
of nature and backs it up with rewards and punishments.399   
VI. REASON AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 
Let us pause to summarize the discussion up to this point.  The Restoration 
order was based on an authoritarian conception of both church and state.400  This 
conception held that the Church of England was coextensive with the 
commonwealth.401  As the successors of the apostles, the Anglican bishops had 
God-given authority to prescribe the doctrine and discipline of the church, and 
their exercise of this authority was backed by the power of the monarch, who 
himself wielded absolute power over his subjects by divine right.402   
To counter this view, Locke developed a radically different theory of 
religion and politics.  This theory was based on the proposition that God had 
made human beings rational creatures with an inherent right to control their 
own minds and bodies.403  The commonwealth was a society of free and equal 
individuals united for the promotion of their welfare in this world, while 
churches were voluntary associations that were formed to advance their 
salvation in the world to come.404  It followed that neither civil nor ecclesiastical 
authorities had the power to compel individuals to follow a particular 
religion.405 
To make this case, Locke had to show that reason was central to religious 
belief.  In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he argued for this 
position on philosophical grounds,406 while in A Letter Concerning Toleration 
he drew on this position to argue in favor of religious liberty.407  Yet to make 
his arguments fully convincing to his contemporaries, he also needed to 
demonstrate that his conception of reason was compatible with Christianity.   
                                                        
399. See supra text accompanying notes 224, 234–54. 
400. See supra Part I. 
401. See supra text accompanying notes 39–43.  
402. See supra Sections II.A–B. 
403. See supra Section III.A. 
404. See supra Parts IV–V.  
405. See supra Section V.B. 
406. See supra Section V.A.1. 
407. See supra Section V.B. 
 
HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/18  4:02 PM 
762 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:705 
   
 
This is the task that Locke undertook in The Reasonableness of Christianity, 
a work that he published in 1695,408 several years after the Essay and the Letter.  
In this Part, I explore the ways in which this work sought to harmonize reason 
and Christian faith, as well as the light that this effort sheds on Locke’s 
approach to religious toleration.   
The Reasonableness of Christianity places reason at the center of an 
account of the creation and redemption of mankind.  According to Locke, man 
was created to be “a Rational Creature.”409  As such, he was necessarily subject 
to the “Law of Reason, or as it is called, of Nature.”410  The first man, Adam, 
began his existence in “the state of perfect Obedience, which is called Justice 
[or Righteousness] in the New Testament.”411  The reward for this obedience 
was immortality.412  Indeed, when the Scriptures say that Adam was “the Son 
of God,” and that he was created in the “Image and Likeness” of God, part of 
what this means is that he was immortal like his divine Father.413   
When Adam disobeyed God’s law by eating the forbidden fruit, he and all 
his posterity lost this “Happy state of Immortality” and entered into “a state of 
Death and Mortality.”414  In his mercy, God sent Jesus Christ to “restore[] all 
mankind to Life.”415  This is the life that all shall “receive again at the 
Resurrection” of the dead.416  At that time, individuals shall be judged in accord 
with their own deeds, and those who are found to be righteous will be entitled 
to receive “Eternal Life.”417   
By itself, however, this did not provide an effective means of salvation.418  
Following the New Testament writers, Locke asserts that righteousness consists 
in “an exact Conformity to the Law.”419  Because all human beings have sinned, 
“it follows, that no one could . . . have Eternal Life and Bliss.”420   
                                                        
408. See WOOLHOUSE, supra note 14, at 350. 
409. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. II, at 13. 
410. Id.  
411. Id. ch. I, at 6.  
412. See id. ch. II, at 12; id. ch. III, at 19; id. ch. XI, at 119.  
413. Id. ch. XI, at 113–15.  In the First Treatise, Locke contends that being made in the image 
of God means, in part, that man is “an intellectual Creature.”  LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, 
bk. I, § 30, at 162. 
414. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. II, at 12; id. ch. I, at 6. 
415. Id. ch. II, at 11.  
416. Id. ch. II, at 12. 
417. Id.  
418. See id. ch. II, at 14–16.  
419. Id. ch. II, at 12–13.  
420. Id. ch. II, at 13.  
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Of course, one might ask why God gave “so hard a Law to Mankind” that 
no one before Christ’s time had succeeded in keeping it.421  Locke responds that   
[i]t was such a Law as the Purity of God’s Nature required, and 
must be the Law of such a Creature as Man, unless God would 
have made him a Rational Creature, and not required him to 
have lived by the Law of Reason, but would have 
countenanced in him Irregularity and Disobedience to that 
Light which he had; and that Rule which was suitable to his 
Nature: Which would have been, to have authorized Disorder, 
Confusion, and Wickedness in his Creatures.422 
Locke adds that if individuals were permitted “to forsake Reason in one point,” 
there would be no logical stopping place.423  Moreover, because the dictates of 
reason are the commands of God, the violation of any one of them amounts to 
“direct Rebellion” against him.424  To countenance such rebellion would 
undermine all “Government and Order” and leave human beings to unbounded 
lawlessness.425   
It was on these grounds that God required mankind to live by the law of 
nature.426  In addition to being knowable through natural reason, this law was 
the same as the moral part of the law that God had given to the people of Israel 
through Moses.427  In the words of St. Paul, this law was “holy, just, and good,” 
yet it was not sufficient to save human beings.428   
For this reason, God provided a new means of salvation that the New 
Testament calls “the Law of Faith.”429  According to Locke, this law did not 
dispense with the moral law contained in the Old Testament: because that law 
is “conformable to the Eternal Law of Right” embodied in the law of nature and 
reason, it “is of Eternal Obligation, and therefore remains in force still under 
the Gospel; nor is abrogated by the Law of Faith.”430  But while the law of 
Moses was a “Law of Works” that could be satisfied only through “perfect 
                                                        
421. Id.  
422. Id.  
423. Id. ch. II, at 14.  
424. Id.  
425. Id.  
426. See id. ch. II, at 13–14.  
427. See id. ch. III, at 17–18.  
428. Id. ch. II, at 14 (quoting Romans 7:12).  
429. Id. ch. II, at 16.   
430. Id. ch. III, at 18–19.  
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Obedience,”431 God now offered a “New Covenant”432 under which those who 
have faith “are admitted to Life and Immortality as if they were Righteous.”433   
According to Locke, faith consists in a belief in God and in the promises he 
has made to human beings.434  The crucial question, then, is “what God requires 
[people] to believe[] as a condition of the [New] Covenant.”435  The bulk of The 
Reasonableness of Christianity is devoted to an exploration of this question.  
Locke conducts an exhaustive review of the four Gospels as well as the book 
of Acts to discern what Christ and his apostles preached to be necessary for 
salvation.436  Locke concludes that, in addition to believing in “one invisible, 
Eternal, Omnipotent God” who is the “maker of Heaven and Earth,”437 the only 
thing a person must believe is that Jesus Christ is the Messiah or King who was 
sent by God to redeem mankind.438   
At the same time, Locke contends that mere belief is not enough: to gain 
the advantages and salvation that come from Christ’s kingdom, individuals 
must become members of that kingdom through baptism and must live in 
obedience to its laws.439  To be sure, Locke observes, Christ “did not 
expect . . . a Perfect Obedience, void of all slips and falls: He knew our Make, 
and the weakness of our Constitutions too well, and was sent with a Supply for 
that Defect.”440  But his subjects were required to make “a sincere Endeavour 
after Righteousness, in obeying his Law”¾a law that is “of Eternal Obligation” 
because it “arise[s] from the Constitution of [Man’s] very Nature” as “a 
Rational Creature.”441  Christ came into the world not to undermine this law 
but, “on the contrary, to reform the corrupt state of degenerate Man; And out of 
those who would mend their Lives, and bring forth Fruit meet for Repentance, 
erect a new Kingdom.”442 
This summary of the Reasonableness highlights some of the ways in which 
Locke contends that Christianity accords with reason.  First, at the core of the 
work is the notion that God made human beings to be rational creatures.  
                                                        
431. Id. ch. III, at 17. 
432. Id. ch. XI, at 111–12. 
433. Id. ch. III, at 19, 22.  
434. See id. ch. III, at 21–22.  
435. Id. ch. III, at 22.  
436. See, e.g., id. ch. IV–V, at 22–27. 
437. Id. ch. III, at 22. 
438. See id. ch. IV, at 22–25.  Locke indicates, however, that belief that Jesus is the Messiah also 
includes belief in the “concomitant Articles of his Resurrection, Rule, and coming again to Judge the 
World.”  Id. ch. XV, at 164; see also id. ch. V, at 25–26.  
439. See id. ch. XI, at 111, 118.  
440. Id. ch. XI, at 120.  
441. Id. ch. XI, at 119.  
442. Id.  
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Second, Locke treats the law of God as essentially identical with the law of 
nature and reason.  Third, while Locke represents this law in highly demanding 
terms, he also holds that individuals will be saved if they sincerely strive to 
follow it, even though they inevitably fall short.  In this way, he seeks to show 
that the law is reasonable not only in an objective sense (in establishing an ideal 
standard of rational human conduct), but also in a subjective sense (in 
recognizing that a sincere effort to meet this standard is all that can be expected 
of human beings).  Fourth, like other English latitudinarians, Locke seeks to 
radically simplify the essentials of Christian belief so that they do not require 
one to grasp difficult metaphysical concepts such as the Trinity, but instead 
consist of more straightforward assertions that even poor and uneducated 
people can understand.443 
In all these ways, Locke endeavors to show that the Christian doctrine on 
salvation is consonant with reason.  Remarkably, however, he does not insist 
that Christianity provides the sole path to salvation.  Toward the end of the 
work, he takes up “[t]he common Objection” that if sinners are justified through 
faith in Christ, what shall become of all the people who could not believe in 
him because they lived before his time?444  Locke’s response is that individuals 
cannot  be required to believe any promises other than the ones that God has 
made to them.445  In the time before Christ, God had promised the people of 
Israel that he would send a “Ruler and Deliverer.”446  It follows that 
[a]ll . . . that was required, before [Christ’s] appearing in the 
World, was to believe what God had revealed; And to rely with 
a full assurance on God for the performance of his Promise; 
And to believe, that in due time he would send them the 
Messiah; this anointed King; this promised Saviour, and 
Deliverer, according to his Word. 
This Faith in the promises [and Faithfulness] of 
God; . . . [t]he Almighty takes well at our hands, as a great 
mark of homage, paid by us poor frail Creatures, to his 
Goodness and Truth, as well as to his Power and Wisdom; And 
accepts it as an acknowledgment of his peculiar Providence, 
and Benignity to us. . . . The works of Nature shew his Wisdom 
and Power; But [it is] his peculiar Care of Mankind, most 
                                                        
443. See id. ch. XV, at 167–71.  On Locke and latitudinarianism, see John C. Higgins-Biddle, 
Introduction to LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, at lxiii–lxvii, lxxiv, cxiv–
cxv; MARSHALL, RESISTANCE, supra note 8, at 57–59, 78–81, 122–25, 372–76. 
444. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIII, at 135.  
445. See id.  
446. Id.  
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eminently discovered in his Promises to them, that shews his 
Bounty and Goodness; And consequently engages their Hearts 
in Love and Affection to him.  This oblation of an Heart, fixed 
with dependance on and affection to him, is the most 
acceptable Tribute we can pay him; the foundation of true 
Devotion; and Life of all Religion.447 
This passage is noteworthy not only for the way in which it broadens the 
potential for salvation beyond those who profess belief in Christ but also for the 
way in which it portrays faith.  In the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke 
tended to characterize faith in cognitive terms, that is, as the acceptance of 
particular propositions.448  By contrast, the passage just quoted represents faith 
in emotional terms as well.  This serves to reinforce Locke’s argument for 
toleration, for the use of coercion can no more cause individuals to incline their 
hearts toward God with “Love and Affection” than it can compel them to accept 
particular beliefs or doctrines.449   
Locke widens his account of salvation still further when he considers the 
fate of those who have never heard even the promise of a savior who is to 
come.450  Once again, Locke responds that individuals cannot be required to 
believe in a revelation they have never received.451  As St. Paul recognized, 
those who did not belong to the people of Israel were capable of knowing the 
law of nature by means of reason.452  By the same token, Locke maintains that 
such individuals are capable of using reason to discover means of attaining 
forgiveness for sins:  
God had, by the Light of Reason, revealed to all Mankind, who 
would make use of that Light, that he was Good and Merciful.  
The same spark of the Divine Nature and Knowledge in Man, 
which making him a Man, shewed him the Law he was under 
as a Man; Shewed him also the way of Attoning the merciful, 
kind, compassionate Author and Father of him and his Being, 
when he had transgressed that Law.  He that made use of this 
Candle of the Lord, so far as to find what was his Duty; could 
not miss to find also the way to Reconciliation and 
                                                        
447. Id. ch. XIII, at 135–36. 
448. See supra text accompanying notes 312–29. 
449. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIII, at 136. 
450. See id. ch. XIV, at 139.  
451. See id.  
452. See id. ch. III, at 17–18 (quoting Romans 2:14). 
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Forgiveness, when he had failed of his Duty.453 
In this passage, Locke goes beyond the position that we discussed earlier—
that natural religion lies at the heart of religion454—and contends that, under at 
least some circumstances, natural religion may be sufficient for salvation.   As 
he recognized, this was a highly controversial view, for many people 
understood the New Testament to hold that no one could be saved without a 
belief in Jesus Christ.455 
At the time Locke wrote, there were a growing number of Deists, who 
rejected Christianity at least to the extent that it taught any truths that were 
above reason.456  Locke’s defense of natural religion might seem to imply that 
he believed that Deism was sufficient for salvation.  In the Reasonableness, he 
stopped short of taking this position.  Instead, he asserted that none of those “to 
whom the Gospel hath been Preached, shall be Saved, without believing Jesus 
to be the Messiah.”457  Yet under the logic of Locke’s position, salvation does 
not necessarily seem to be limited in this way.  In this work, he insists that God 
does not demand that individuals hold any beliefs that they cannot reasonably 
be expected to adopt, while in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
and the Letters on Toleration, he indicates that reason alone may not be 
sufficient to demonstrate the truth of a revealed religion.458  It seems to follow 
that God would not condemn those who were aware of the Christian message 
but who reasonably found themselves unconvinced by it.459  As Locke says in 
discussing faith and reason in the Essay: 
                                                        
453. Id. ch. XIV, at 139–40 (footnote omitted).  For an earlier statement along the same lines, 
see Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 74, ms. at 75–76; cf. Locke, Of God’s Justice 
(1680), in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 277, 277–78. 
454. See supra text accompanying notes 221–33. 
455. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 141 
(observing that Acts 4:10-12 asserts that “there is none other name under Heaven given among men, 
in which we must be saved”).  Indeed, this was the doctrine of the Church of England as contained in 
the Thirty-Nine Articles, which condemned anyone who should “presume to say, That every man shall 
be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to 
that Law, and the light of Nature.”  THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES, supra note 27, art. XVIII. 
456. See, e.g., JOHN TOLAND, CHRISTIANITY NOT MYSTERIOUS (1696); COFFEY, supra note 18, 
at 200.  For some valuable discussions of Locke’s relation to Deism, see Higgins-Biddle, supra note 
444, at xv–xlii; MARSHALL, RESISTANCE, supra note 8, at 407–10, 414–15, 441–42, 454. 
457. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XII, at 134. 
458. See, e.g., LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 357, at 88; 
LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. I, at 143–45; id. ch. IX, at 401–02, 419–
21. 
459. Cf. LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 357, at 75 (arguing 
that individuals who remain “out of the national church” because “they are not yet convinced” are 
guilty of “no fault,” and that it therefore would be unjust for the government to punish them). 
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[H]e that makes use of the Light and Faculties GOD has given 
him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth, by those Helps and 
Abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his Duty 
as a rational Creature, that though he should miss Truth, he will 
not miss the Reward of it.460 
That is not to say that Locke endorses Deism.  On the contrary, as he later 
observed, The Reasonableness of Christianity was directed at least in part 
against that view.461  As we have seen, Locke holds that so long as it is regulated 
by reason, revealed religion has substantial advantages over mere natural 
religion, for the Gospel teaches things about the rules and the rewards of virtue 
that could not discovered through natural reason alone.462  To put it another 
way, Locke maintains that ideally one should be “both . . . a Deist and a 
Christian”—that is, should seek out the will of God by studying “both the Law 
of Nature and the Revealed Law.”463   
Yet this does not lead Locke to conclude that non-Christians can never be 
saved.  Instead, he seems to hold that while salvation depends on faith that God 
is “merciful, kind, and compassionate” and that he will pardon those who 
sincerely seek his forgiveness for sins, this faith may be based on what God has 
revealed through “the light of Nature” and not only through “particular 
Promises.”464  In this way, he seems to open the door to salvation for Deists as 
well as for the adherents of non-Christian religions, to the extent that those 
individuals follow the precepts of natural religion.   
In short, while Locke may believe that a rational form of Christianity has 
advantages over other forms of belief, he appears to recognize that there are 
other paths to salvation.465  This position, which is consistent with his stress on 
the centrality of reason in the relationship between human beings and God, 
provides additional support for a principle of religious toleration.  That 
principle is further reinforced by Locke’s effort in the Reasonableness to 
simplify the Christian faith—an effort that not only makes the faith more 
                                                        
460. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24, at 688; accord 
John Locke, Error (1698), in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 345, 345–46. 
461. See JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND VINDICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 
(1697) [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND VINDICATION], in VINDICATIONS OF THE REASONABLENESS OF 
CHRISTIANITY 27, 36, 71, 101, 191 (Victor Nuovo ed., Clarendon Press 2012). 
462. See supra text accompanying notes 258–72. 
463. LOCKE, SECOND VINDICATION, supra note 461, at 71. 
464. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIII, at 137–39; id. ch. 
XIV, at 139–41.  
465. Alternatively, if one reads the Reasonableness to preclude this, the most plausible 
conclusion is that Locke is speaking there purely as a Christian theologian rather than a philosopher.   
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accessible to all individuals, including the poor and uneducated, but that also 
highlights the fundamental beliefs that all Christians hold in common rather 
than the points on which they disagree.466   
VII. CONCLUSION: LOCKE’S LEGACY FOR AMERICA 
In works like A Letter Concerning Toleration and Two Treatises of 
Government, Locke sought to transform the traditional Western view of religion 
and politics as it was embodied in Restoration England.  That view regarded 
church and state as interdependent institutions that were empowered by God to 
direct the spiritual and temporal lives of individuals and that were entitled to 
unquestioning obedience.   
In challenging this authoritarian position, Locke proposed a radically 
different starting point, which held that individuals were rational creatures who 
were naturally free to direct their own thoughts and actions.  The state was a 
society of rational creatures who had voluntarily joined together to protect their 
civil interests.  Reason and freedom were also central to the religious sphere.  
As rational creatures, individuals had an inherent and inalienable liberty to form 
their own beliefs and to worship God in a manner they believed to be acceptable 
to him.  Neither the government nor private parties had any right to injure others 
on account of religion, to deprive them of their civil rights, or to coerce them to 
conform to a particular church.  Instead, churches were free and voluntary 
associations that individuals entered in the hope of attaining salvation.  On this 
view, church and state did not form a unified and divinely ordained religious 
and political order but rather were separate and distinct institutions that were 
founded upon the consent of their members.  In these ways, Locke sought to 
liberate individuals from “Tyranny in the Commonwealth”467 as well as “from 
all Dominion over one another in matters of Religion.”468 
Although Locke’s writings on religion and toleration were influential in 
late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England,469 that nation stopped short 
of granting the broad toleration that he advocated, let alone establishing a 
separation of church and state.470  Similarly, Locke’s political theory was too 
                                                        
466. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XV, at 169–71; 
Higgins-Biddle, supra note 444, at cxiv–cxv.  In the Letter, Locke highlights the connection between 
this approach and religious toleration.  See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, 
at 7–10, 16–18, 27–28, 64–67. 
467. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 61. 
468. Id. at 32. 
469. See SELL, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
470. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 198–206. 
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radical to achieve full acceptance in his own country.  By contrast, his views 
had a much deeper impact in the New World.   
Of course, this is not the place to fully explore the reception of Locke’s 
views in America or to trace the ways in which the new republics followed, 
expanded upon, and deviated from them.  Instead, I wish to conclude with a 
brief look at a few classic documents that reflect the themes discussed in this 
Article, and that make clear the profound role that Locke’s thought played in 
laying the foundations for the American political order in general and its 
protections for religious liberty in particular.   
First, consider the Declaration of Independence, which sets forth a 
justification for the American Revolution that accords with Lockean concepts 
of natural rights, natural law, and natural religion.471  After opening with an 
invocation of “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” the Declaration asserts 
that he has created all human beings equal and has endowed them with 
“unalienable Rights” to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”;472 that 
individuals consent to establish government for the protection of these rights;473 
and that when the government abuses its power, the people have a right to 
revolution.474  The document then enumerates the ways that King George III 
had abused his power and become a “Tyrant.”475  The signers conclude by 
“appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our 
intentions” and by declaring their polities to be free and independent states that 
are absolved of all allegiance to the British crown.476  In this way, the 
Declaration launches the new American political order on Lockean 
principles.477  Those principles also form the basis for the first state bills of 
rights, such as the Virginia Declaration that I discussed in the Introduction.478 
Lockean views also lie at the heart of some leading American defenses of 
religious liberty, including the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom that 
                                                        
471. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 2, Bill of Rights, doc. 3, at 4, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s5.html [https://perma.cc/89YQ-EWTD].   
472. Id. 
473. Id. 
474. Id. 
475. Id. at 5. 
476. Id. 
477. See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF 
POLITICAL IDEAS ch. II (1922); ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC, supra note 7, at 16. 
478. See supra text accompanying notes 2–5. 
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Thomas Jefferson drafted in 1779.479  The bill’s preamble recites many of the 
Lockean positions that we have seen in this Article:  
• “[T]hat Almighty God hath created the mind free, 
and . . . ma[de] it altogether insusceptible of restraint”;480 
• “[T]hat the opinions and belief of men depend not on their 
own will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed 
to their minds”;481 
• That “the holy author of our religion” has “chose[n] not to 
propagate it by coercions on either [mind or body], . . . but 
to extend it by its influence on reason alone”;482 
• That civil and ecclesiastical rulers are “but fallible and 
uninspired men,” whose efforts to “assume[] dominion 
over the faith of others, . . . hath established and 
maintained false religions over the greatest part of the 
world, and through all time”;483 
• “That our civil rights have no dependance on our religious 
opinions, any more than on our opinions in physicks or 
geometry”;484 
• “That the opinions of men are not the object of civil 
government, nor under its jurisdiction”;485 
• “And finally, that truth is great and will prevail if left to 
herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to 
errour, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by 
human interposition, disarmed of her natural weapons, free 
argument and debate; errours ceasing to be dangerous 
when it is permitted freely to [contradict] them.”486 
For these and other reasons, the bill then provided 
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
relig[i]ous Worship place or Ministry whatsoever, nor shall be 
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or 
                                                        
479. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779), 
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 37, at 77, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions37.html [https://perma.cc/8QMJ-QP7V].  
For a discussion of Jefferson’s reliance on Locke’s writings on toleration, see DAVID N. MAYER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158–60 (1994). 
480. JEFFERSON, supra note 479, at 77.   
481. Id. 
482. Id. 
483. Id. 
484. Id. 
485. Id. 
486. Id. 
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goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
opinions or belief, but that all men shall be free to profess, and 
by argument to maintain their opinions in matters of religion, 
and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect 
their civil capacities.487 
The bill concluded by declaring “that the rights hereby asserted are of the 
natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal 
the present [bill], or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of 
natural right.”488   
In 1786, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a revised version of 
Jefferson’s bill after defeating a proposal to impose a tax for the support of 
religious ministry.489  The controversy over that proposal also produced another 
classic defense of religious liberty, James Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.490 
Like Jefferson’s bill, Madison’s Memorial is steeped in a Lockean view of 
religion and liberty of conscience.491  After quoting the Virginia Declaration’s 
assertion “[t]hat Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction, not 
by force or violence,” the Memorial contends that the free exercise of religion 
“is in its nature an unalienable right” for two reasons: 
(1) “because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated 
by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men,” and (2) “because 
what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator.”492  It follows 
“that in matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil 
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”493  The 
Memorial also maintains that those who claim religious liberty for themselves 
must be willing to allow “an equal freedom to [others]”;494 that establishments 
                                                        
487. Id. (alteration in original). 
488. Id. 
489. VIRGINIA, ACT FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1785), reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 44, at 84, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions44.html [https://perma.cc/7D6E-4N38].  
Jefferson’s Act was signed into law in January 1786.  See BANNING, supra note 4, at 97.  For an account 
of the pitched political and legislative battle over the religious assessments bill, see id. at 88–97. 
490. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
(1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 43, at 82–83, 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html 
[https://perma.cc/6MD5-WLUH]. 
491. See BANNING, supra note 4, at 91–93. 
492. MADISON, supra note 490, § 1, at 82 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 
2, art. 16, at 3–4). 
493. Id. 
494. Id. § 4, at 82. 
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of religion improperly assume “either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent 
Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil 
policy”;495 that far from being necessary for the support of either religion or 
civil government, such establishments tend to corrupt religion, to promote 
“spiritual” and “political tyranny,” and to endanger “the liberties of the 
people”;496 and finally that the use of state power to impose religious uniformity 
tends to induce struggles for power between sects, to undermine “‘Christian 
forbearance, love and charity,’” and to provoke disobedience to the 
government.497   
Finally, while there is a substantial debate about the original meaning of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,498 it seems beyond dispute that 
the Free Exercise Clause was meant to protect religious liberty understood as 
an inalienable right of individuals.  In his speech introducing the Bill of Rights 
in the First Congress, Madison discussed the rights protected by the state 
declarations and contended that those rights should also be protected at the 
federal level.499  He observed that those rights included the “natural right[s]” of 
individuals, or “those rights which are retained when particular powers are 
given up to be exercised by the Legislature.”500  As we have seen, the state 
declarations described the right to religious liberty in these terms.501  The same 
natural rights view can be found in discussions of religious freedom during the 
debates over ratification of the Federal Constitution,502 as well as in the 
                                                        
495. Id. § 5, at 83. 
496. Id. §§ 6–8, 15, at 83–84. 
497. Id. §§ 11, 13, at 83, 84 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, art. 16, at 4). 
498. Compare, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1947) (Black, J.) (maintaining 
that the Establishment Clause was intended to reflect the same principles as Jefferson’s Act for 
Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia), with Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 541 U.S. 
1, 49–50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (contending that the clause is simply “a 
federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments” of 
religion, not a protection for individual religious liberty).  
499. For Madison’s speech, see HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, Bill of Rights, doc. 11, 
at 20–40, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss11.html 
[https://perma.cc/XF22-BW2L].  
500. Id. at 26. 
501. See supra text accompanying notes 4–5.  The state provisions are collected (together with 
colonial and related provisions) in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS § 1.1.3, at 13–52 (Neil H. Cogan 
ed., 1997).   
502. See, e.g., CENTINEL, No. 2 (1787), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 501, 
§ 1.2.4.5, at 74 (criticizing the proposed Constitution because it lacks a “declaration, that all men have 
a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own 
consciences and understanding”); AN OLD WHIG, No. 5 (1787), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 501 § 1.2.4.7, at 75–76 (describing “LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE” as a “natural 
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constitutional amendments that were proposed by the state ratifying 
conventions.503  In these ways, the Free Exercise Clause clearly was rooted in 
the vision of human liberty that Locke had articulated a century earlier.   
 
                                                        
right[] . . . which it is of the utmost importance for the people to retain to themselves, which indeed 
they have not even the right to surrender, and which at the same time it is of no kind of advantages to 
government to strip them of”).  
503. For example, the New York convention urged an amendment to declare “[t]hat the People 
have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion according 
to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought to be favored or established 
by Law in preference of others.”  New York Proposal (1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 501, § 1.1.2.4, at 12.  For other state proposals, see THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 501, § 1.1.2, at 11–13.   
